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Prior to the late nineteenth century, little was done to
preserve American wilderness, although its appreciation as
both a natural and spiritual resource grew.
With the
approach of the twentieth century, protection of wilderness
and forests areas began to occur.
There developed, however,
two very different arguments for protection.
There were
arguments for landscape conservation which considered
forests as a natural, market resource.
Others favored
preservation of wilderness for more aesthetic and spiritual
reasons.
The tension between these two positions, still
manifest in American wilderness politics, can be understood
through the use of paradigms and subsequently presented as a
reflection of the tension between the two competing
paradigms.
Much of a political society's behavior is conditioned by
its dominant social paradigm, which constitutes a society's
beliefs, values, and ideals. American society's dominant
paradigm — Modernism — developed out of historical
elements including the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and
the democratic, industrial, and scientific revolutions.
These in turn effected the conversion of wilderness into a
mechanism or object of scientific inquiry and a material
resource for a market economy. Modernism, however, was not
without its challengers.
Throughout its development, Modernism remained in tension
with its literary, philosophical, and scientific
counterreactions.
The literary alternative appreciated an
immediate, personal, and effective relationship with nature
rather than it as a mere mechanism. The philosophical and
scientific alternatives recognized humankind as a part of
nature, while the classical science of Modernism placed
humans outside of and above it. Both these positions,
Modernism and its challengers, came to be manifest in the
attitudes regarding American wilderness.
An examination of the literature regarding paradigms and
the development of wilderness protection suggests that the
tension between Modernism and its counterreactions is
reflected in the development of American perceptions of
wilderness.
Those arguing for use of forests as a natural,
market resource represented the dominant paradigm of
modernism.
Those arguing for preservation of wilderness for
spiritual reasons represented a competing paradigm.
These
two arguments remain in the present arguments for wilderness
protection.
ii
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EPILOGUE
REFERENCES

INTRODUCTION

This paper explores the concept of paradigms and their
implications to the politics of wilderness preservation in
America.

In order to demonstrate the impact of paradigms

with regard to American wilderness, this paper traces the
history of the American preservation and landscape
conservation movements from the late nineteenth through the
mid-twentieth century to examine the tension between the
competing paradigms of Modernism and its challengers.

The

purpose, then, of this paper is to explore paradigms and
their influence on societal values and worldviews, and to
suggest how paradigmatic tension is manifested in the
history and politics of American wilderness.
In order to discuss paradigms and their role in
understanding American attitudes toward wilderness, it is
necessary to first define and delimit paradigms.

As

discussed in Chapter 1, much of a society's view of its
place and relationship to the world is conditioned by its
dominant social paradigm, which constitutes the beliefs,
values, and ideals that influence members' thinking about
their society, government, and individual responsibilities.
When a paradigm fails to deal adequately with anomalies or
5
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crisis within their methods of perception, the paradigm
shifts to one that will adequately account for the crisis
and incorporates it into its methodology.

It is important

to note that scientific and societal paradigms address these
anomalies very much in the same manner.

The overall

dominant social paradigm may be challenged over a very long
period of time if its values and worldview do not adequately
provide a constant and consistent interpretive framework for
society and its members.
The chapters following the discussion of paradigms
address the development of the dominant social paradigm of
"Modernism," its views towards nature, and how it came to
shape American attitudes towards nature so profoundly.
Modernism and its roots run deep into the history of Western
science and philosophy.

Many of the perceptions and

attitudes toward the natural world in which humankind found
itself in nineteenth and early twentieth century were
conditioned by this dominant paradigm and its institutions
and still linger today:

laissez faire economics, the power

of scientific thought and positivism, nature as a mechanism,
and faith in technology are but a few examples.

There were,

however, competing paradigms to Modernism.
The counterreactions discussed in this paper are
limited to those which accepted many of Modernism's goals,
especially the goals of liberty, prosperity and individual
development, but viewed Modernism’s scientific and
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technological methodologies as either failing to provide a
viable means of achieving or preventing the attainment of
such ends.

In each of these paradigms, however, Modernism

and its counterreactions, the central concern remains the
same —

humankind.

The alternative conceptual frameworks of

Modernism manifested themselves in not only literary
counterreactions, but philosophical and scientific
counterreactions as well.
Literary and philosophical counterreactions against
Modernism and its treatment of nature, the subject of
Chapters 3 and 4, can be seen in the work and thought of
such thinkers as Rousseau, Kant, and Spinoza.

Their legacy

of challenging Modernism was taken up in America by the
Transcendentalists and found articulation in the work of
Ralph Waldo Emerson.

Transcendentalism in turn shaped the

thought of such a pivotal figure in wilderness preservation
as Henry Thoreau.

Wilderness, in the literary and

philosophical counterreaction to Modernism, was imbued with
an aesthetic, spiritual quality denied by Modernism's
mechanistic science.

These qualities ascribed to nature by

Romantic thinkers would remain a central theme of, and help
define, preservationism.
Yet, the philosophical and literary counterreactions
provided only part of the challenge to Modernism.

There was

a scientific challenge as well, discussed in Chapter 5.
With the advent of the thought of scientists such as
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Galileo, Descartes, Bacon, and Newton, nature in the
Modernist worldview took on a quality of a mechanism.
Nature became the object of scientific study and was reduced
to inanimate matter, to be understood solely in rational,
mathematical, quantifiable terms.

But, opposing this

interpretation of nature were physico-theologists and
arcadian scientists who attempted to treat nature as
something more that a mere mechanism.
held that it was an organic whole —
sum of its parts —

Their view of nature
something more than the

and that it ultimately was the result of

the handiwork of God.

Although the notion that nature

revealed the designs of a creator figure eventually proved
to be untenable, the notion of nature as a unified whole,
and that humankind was part of that whole, led directly to
the thought of Charles Darwin, whose influence is still felt
today.
The literary, philosophical, and scientific
counterreactions to Modernism were all manifested in the
emerging views of preservation and landscape conservation
(identified in the remainder of this thesis simply as
"conservation")
America —

in the mid-to-late nineteenth century in

the subject of Chapter 6.

Conservation and

preservation can be seen as representative of the tension
between the competing paradigms of Modernism and its
challengers.

Preservationists utilized literary and

philosophical counterreactions to Modernism to argue for the
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preservation of wilderness for spiritual ends.
Conservationists, although utilizing the scientific
counterreactions, valued managed forest areas, not
wilderness,

for economic ends, rather than aesthetic ones.

This economic utilitarianism of the conservationists, while
challenging inefficient management and waste of natural
resources, came to represent the dominant paradigm of
Modernism.
The epilogue discusses the paradigmatic implications
of preservation and conservation upon American attitudes
towards wilderness.

It discusses as well the possibility of

a shift to a new, more mature view of technology.

While

this technology would remain committed to its initial
promise of enhancing and liberating humankind, it could do
so while preserving wilderness for those same ends as well.
With this more •'advanced'1 technology, the liberation of
nature would be made inseparable from the liberation of
humankind.

CHAPTER 1

PARADIGMS

Introduction
Much of this thesis' concern lies with the perceptions
of wilderness as conditioned by the dominant social paradigm
of Modernism and the impact of Modernism upon the politics
of wilderness preservation.

This chapter introduces the

idea of paradigms, their functions, and their political
implications.

Central to this discussion of paradigms are

the views that societal paradigms behave in patterns similar
to scientific paradigms, that paradigms have and do
experience "anomalies," and that dominant social paradigms
are in constant tension with their alternate or
"counterreactive" paradigms.

The Dominant Social Paradigm
Much of a society's view of its place and relationship
with the world is conditioned by its dominant social
paradigm.

A paradigm represents a typical conditioned

response, example, or pattern.

According to Zachary Smith:

The dominant social paradigm [in the U.S.]
constitutes those clusters of beliefs, values,
and ideals that influence our thinking about
society, government, and individual
10
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responsibilities.
The DSP [dominant social
paradigm] can be defined in various ways, but
it
includes
acceptance
of
laissez-faire
capitalism,
individualism,
growth,
and
progress,
and
a
faith
in
science
and
technology. Our DSP has influenced the history
of
environmental
policy,
public
attitudes
toward
the
environment,
and
environmental
regulations (Smith 1992, 7).
As society shapes and is shaped by its dominant
paradigm, so too are science and worldviews shaped by models
and patterns.

These patterns, however, cannot address all

the possible shortcomings of their particular conceptual
framework and are not immune from change.

Anomalies and Change
Thomas Kuhn, in his work The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. provides an example of how anomalies and change
manifest themselves within scientific paradigms.

The manner

in which change occurs within scientific paradigms may also
be employed to describe change within political society
itself.

Science or "normal science," as treated in Kuhn's

volume, refers mainly to research based upon one or more
past scientific achievements which some particular
scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying
the foundation for its further practice (Kuhn 1970, 10).
Kuhn sees these views and achievements as being advanced
through their use in textbooks.
"Textbooks," according to Kuhn, "expound the body of
accepted theory, illustrate many or all of its successful
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applications, and compare these applications with exemplary
observations and experiments"

(Kuhn, 10).

Prior to the use

of textbooks, well-known classics of science performed a
similar function.

Kuhn lists such works as Aristotle's

Phvsica. Newton's Princioia. Franklin's Electricity, and
Lyell's Principles of Geology as serving to define the
legitimate problems and methods of a research field for its
community of practitioners.

This in turn would come to

influence the conceptual scheme or worldview of the society
in which those practitioners operated.

Such theories were

able to do so for essentially two reasons.

According to

Kuhn:
Their
achievement
was
sufficiently
unprecedented to attract an enduring group of
adherents
away
from
competing
modes
of
scientific activity.
Simultaneously, it was
sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of
problems
for
the
redefined
group
of
practitioners to resolve (Kuhn, 10).
Through his analysis of paradigms, Kuhn contends that
some accepted examples of actual scientific study provide
models or patterns from which spring particular identifiable
traditions of scientific research.

Examples would include

"Ptolemaic astronomy" or "Newtonian dynamics."

According to

Kuhn, the study of paradigms prepares the student for
membership in the particular scientific community with which
he will practice later (Kuhn, 11).

Having been committed to

learning the bases for their science from the same model or
pattern, scientists of each particular field tend to accept
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the same fundamentals with little disagreement.

Commitment

to these bases and the apparent consensus it produces are
prerequisites for the genesis and continuation of a
particular research tradition (Kuhn, 11).

As long as the

paradigm addresses and account for facts, both old and new,
scientists can get on with their jobs, which consists of
solving the puzzles presented by the natural world
(Hall 1963, 701).
Kuhn argues that the paradigm itself is not
identifiable with any specific body of theory.

The paradigm

represents "the source of the methods, problem field, and
standards of solution accepted by any mature scientific
community at any given time," permitting selection,
evaluation, and criticism (Kuhn, 102).

Normal science and

its particular worldview consists of working within the
constraints of one paradigm, making it more explicit and
precise, and actualizing its original goal by extending the
knowledge of those facts that the paradigm displays as
particularly revealing (Shapere 1971, 706).
As articulation of the paradigm takes place, anomalies
arise, representing facts which cannot be accounted for or
cannot be fashioned to fit within the paradigm —
failed theoretical Procrustean bed.

a sort of

These anomalies give

rise to what Kuhn describes as revolutionary science ("non
normal science"):
Confronted with an anomaly or with crisis,
scientists take a different attitude toward
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existing paradigms, and the nature of their
research
changes
accordingly.
The
proliferation of competing articulations, the
willingness to try anything, the expression of
discontent, the recourse to philosophy and to
debate
over
fundamentals,
all
these
are
symptoms
of a transition
from normal
to
extraordinary research (Kuhn, 90).
Scientific, and consequently, worldview revolutions are
inaugurated by a growing sense that an existing paradigm has
ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an
aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had
previously pioneered.

Kuhn's emphasis is that in such

revolutions the older paradigm is replaced in whole or in
part by a new paradigm (Shapere, 706).
The success of a new or revolutionary paradigm
necessitates a partial or full relinquishment of one set of
paradigmatic institutions in favor of another.

In

describing the change from a Newtonian to Einsteinian world
view, Kuhn argues that:
This need to change the meaning of established
and
familiar concepts
is central
to the
revolutionary impact of Einstein's theory.
Though
subtler
than
the
changes
from
geocentrism
to
heliocentrism...or
from
corpuscles to waves, the resulting conceptual
transformation
is
no
less
decisively
destructive
of
a
previously
established
paradigm.
We may even come to see it as a
prototype for revolutionary reorientations in
the sciences (Kuhn, 102).
Revolutions need not introduce new objects of study or even
concepts; rather, they consist of major displacements of the
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conceptual network through which the scientist and
ultimately members of society view the world.
The idea of major conceptual displacements as a result
of paradigmatic shifts is not without its detractors.

Two

main types of objections to Kuhn's work have been raised.
The first position questions the definition and use of
paradigms.

According to Dudley Shapere:

[The] term [paradigm is, at its outset] applied
to a set of recurrent and quasi-standard
illustrations of various theories which are
revealed
in...textbooks,
lectures,
and
laboratory exercises, [and] ultimately appears
a s ... anything and everything that allows the
scientist to do anything.. .the term is so vague
that...it is difficult to identify what is
supposed to be the paradigm (Shapere, 706).
The second major type of objection against Kuhn's view
relates to the relativism suggested by his theory.

With the

determinative nature of the paradigm, Kuhn appears to deny
the objectivity of facts and the choice, on objective
grounds, between paradigms.

He writes:

"The competition

between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be
resolved by proofs...[but is more like] a conversion
experience...[it is] simply a change demanded by the
adoption of a new paradigm" (Kuhn, 140).

Objectivity and

progress, traditional interpretations of science, are
abandoned by Kuhn to the point of holding that if the same
terms continue to be used after a scientific revolution,
those terms have different meanings (Shapere, 707).
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Paradigms and Political Society
Despite these objections to paradigms, Kuhn's work
offers a useful tool not only in the discussion of
scientific paradigms but societal paradigms as well, and
their impact upon society and its models and patterns of
perception.

In her work Ecological Revolutions. Carolyn

Merchant makes use of Kuhn's thought regarding scientific
revolutions in a most convincing manner.

According to

Merchant:
Thomas Kuhn [in The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions'! approached major transformations
in scientific consciousness from a perspective
internal to the workings of science and the
community of scientists.
Scientific paradigms
are structures of thought shared by groups of
scientists within which problems are solved.
When a sufficient amount of anomalies challenge
a scientific theory, scientists construct new
paradigms,
thus
initiating
new
scientific
revolutions (Merchant 1989, 3).
Merchant sees the strength of Kuhn's theory in its
recognition of stable worldviews in science and philosophy
that exist over relatively long periods of time but that can
experience rapid change during periods of stress and crisis.
Paradigms are not limited, however, to stable
worldviews in science.

Sheldon Wolin, in his article

"Paradigms and Political Theory," proposes that:
We conceive of political society itself as a
paradigm. From this viewpoint society would be
envisaged as a coherent whole in the sense of
its
customary
political
practices,
institutions, laws, structure of authority and
citizenship,
and
operative
beliefs
being
organized and interrelated.
A politically
organized society contains definite
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institutional
arrangements,
certain
widely
shared understandings regarding the location
and
use
of
political
power,
certain
expectations about how authority ought to treat
the members of society and about the claims
that organized society can rightfully make upon
its members...This ensemble of practices and
beliefs may be said to form a paradigm in the
sense that the society tries to carry on its
political
life
in
accordance
with
them.
Further, in its agencies of enforcement and in
its systems of rules, a political society
possesses the basic instrumentalities present
in Kuhn's scientific community and employs them
in analogous ways.
Society, too, enforces
certain
types
of conduct and discourages
others;
it,
too,
defines
what
sort
of
experiments —
in the form of individual or
group actions — will be encouraged, tolerated,
or suppressed; by its complex organization of
politics
through
legislatures,
political
parties, and the media of opinion, society also
determines what shall count in determining
future decisions (Wolin 1968, 149).
Furthermore, as a paradigm, political society is apt to
experience paradigmatic anomalies and counterreactions for
reasons similar to those experienced in the scientific
community.

Conclusion
The first step to understanding humankind is the
creation of a model or models that come to dominate and
penetrate its thought and action.

According to Isaiah

Berlin:
The history of thought and culture is, as Hegel
showed with great brilliance,
a changing
pattern
of
great
liberating
ideas
which
inevitably
turn
into
suffocating
straightjacket, and so stimulate their own
destruction by new emancipating, and at the
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same time, enslaving conceptions.
The first
step to understanding of men is the bringing to
consciousness of the model or models that
dominate and penetrate their thought and action
(Berlin, quoted by Bernstein 1976, 57).
A useful tool in this step is the notion of paradigms.
Paradigms help to identify those clusters of beliefs,
values, and ideals that influence how individuals and
societies think about themselves, their government, and
their responsibilities.

Furthermore, paradigms provide for

a society or community a set of instruments that allow the
promotion or repression of certain ideas or practices.
There are, however, additional elements regarding paradigms
that this focuses upon.
As noted by Hegel, perhaps most important is that
patterns of thought once viewed as liberating inevitably
turn into stifling constraints and in turn provide the seeds
of their own destruction.

There is in any paradigmatic

scheme an ever-present tension between what has become the
dominant paradigm and the underlying counterreaction to it.
A paradigm cannot manage successfully the entire array of
anomalies discovered within its purview.

The

counterreaction or alternate to this paradigm seeks to
answer these anomalies within its own framework of thought.
When the dominant paradigm finally reaches a point where it
can no longer successfully manage the anomalies presented to
it, and maintain its theoretical and practical validity at
the same time, the counterreaction will succeed the former
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paradigm as the dominant paradigm and a paradigmatic
revolution will have taken place.
Paradigmatic revolutions at the societal level,
however, are not necessarily as rapid as those that might be
experienced in the scientific realm.

The following chapters

will show that what has come to be the dominant social
paradigm of the Western world —

Modernism —

has, for more

than the past three centuries, been constantly in a state of
tension with literary, philosophic, and scientific
counterreactions.

Moreover, these chapters will show that

this tension between the dominant social paradigm and its
counterreactions manifests itself in conservation and
preservation movements that developed in America in the midto-late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

CHAPTER 2

OLD WORLD ROOTS OF THOUGHT ABOUT WILDERNESS

Introduction
As noted in the previous chapter, the dominant social
paradigm —
worldview —

a society's values and beliefs cluster or
does much to influence societal behavior.

In a

discussion of the present values and worldviews that help
form today's dominant social paradigm and its subsequent
impact upon American views towards wilderness, it is
necessary first to look briefly at America's Old-World
antecedents and their influence on American perception and
thought.

Wilderness and America
In his volume Wilderness and the American Mind.
Roderick Nash argues that wilderness is a basic ingredient
of American civilization.

According to Nash:

From
the
raw
materials
of
the
physical
wilderness Americans built a civilization, with
the idea or symbol of wilderness they sought to
give
that
civilization
identity
and
m e a n i n g . ..Wilderness
currently
enjoys
widespread and growing popularity... From the
perspective
of
intellectual
history,
this
appreciation of wilderness is nothing less than
revolutionary. Ancient biases against the wild
are deeply rooted in human psychology
20
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and in the human compulsion to understand,
order and transform the environment in the
interest of survival, and later, of success.
Wilderness was the unknown, the disordered, and
[the] uncontrolled.
A large portion of the
energies of early civilizations was directed at
defeating the wilderness nature controlling it
in
human
nature.
America
knew
these
imperatives first hand: the European colonists
reexperienced in America their old, insecure
relationships to wilderness (Nash 1982, xi).
Thus the American attitude toward wilderness is far older,
more complex than normally assumed.
Before continuing the discussion of the old-world
roots of American attitudes toward wilderness, the term
wilderness must be defined.

A useful tool in this case is

Nash's employment of a spectrum in which the notion of
wilderness may be understood.

At one end of the spectrum is

an environment without any human activity or impact, while
at the other end of the spectrum civilization can be found.
This spectrum allows for nuances in the perception of
wilderness.

According to Nash:

Wilderness and civilization become antipodal
influences which combine in varying proportions
to determine the character of an area.
In the
middle portions of the spectrum is the rural or
pastoral
environment
(the
ploughed)
that
represents a balance of the forces of nature
and man.
As one moves toward the wilderness
pole from this midpoint, the human influence
appears less frequently...On the other side of
the rural range, the degree to which man
affects nature increases.
Finally, close to
the pole of civilization, the natural setting
that the wild and rural conditions share gives
way to the purely synthetic condition that
exists in a metropolis (Nash, 6).
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Vast, unmodified regions free of human influence are found
closest to the wilderness pole.

Areas, such as those

forests envisioned by conservationists, managed by humans as
reservoirs of natural resources, are moved by management
activities away from the wilderness pole toward
civilization.
*

Such forest were not the goal of

preservationists.
The origins of European and American thought about
nature and wilderness can be traced back to Greek
philosophers, as well as to the principles provided by the
Judeo-Christian tradition, that came to dominate Europe.
The principle theme of Western thought, expressed by this
paper, is its placing humans apart from and above the world
in which they reside.
The conceptual separation of humankind from the
natural world received much attention in classical Greek
philosophy and came to provide an important influence upon
the development of European wilderness values.

A major

contribution of Greek philosophy to European thought was the
use of reason.

According to Max Oelschlaeger:

Whatever [the Greeks] borrowed from either the
ancients
or
their
contemporaries
they
transformed through their commitment to reason.
No serious student of Western civilization
underestimates the importance of the rise of
Greek rationalism on our own live, for 'Reason'
lurks always beneath its surface.
Greek
rationalism is often presented as a unique
vantage point from which to view the evolution
of the European mind towards civilization. The
historical documents that survive show clearly
a breaking away from
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primitive
attitudes
into
progress
and
elementary science, from myths into disciplined
acquisition of knowledge about the universe
(Oelschlaeger 1991, 54).
Oelschlaeger points out, however, that there is within the
Greek tradition a tension between the Dionysian and
Apollonian worldviews.

Although the lasting impression upon

the European mind was toward rational, reasoned thought, the
tension between the Apollonian rational and Dionysian
aesthetic remained, as will be discussed throughout the
following chapters.
Socrates, who served as the epitome of Greek rational
thought, contributed to Western philosophy the notion of a
homocentric universe.

In Oelschlaeger's view, "What is

revolutionary is the Socratic conception of the good life as
essentially a reflective attending to and nurturing of the
soul" (Oelschlaeger, 56).

The result shows humankind

turning its attention inward, away from the world that
surrounds it, and towards self-conscious reason.

Although

human life was lived among an ever-changing and mutable
material world, Socrates identified this as a problem for
the soul to overcome.

Knowledge, or a rational

understanding of a wise course of action, depended on forms
from outside of nature.

According to Oelschlaeger:

In this attitude lurks the germ of a pervasive
dualism and logocentrism,
sometimes called
Eurocentrism,
that
since the Greeks,
has
infected virtually all Western philosophy,
science, and religion.
Its effects on Western
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civilization have been far-reaching and longlasting (Oelschlaeger, 57).
Socrates ultimately argued that everything for mankind
seemed preordained and that nature was provided by the gods
for humanity's use.
Plato, primarily through his work Timaeus, continued
in the Socratic tradition in viewing nature as something
that could be acted upon by humans and maintained that
humans could improve upon nature.

Clarence Glacken believes

that in a period that lacked precision measurements and
instruments, high skill was achieved in carving, metal work,
and the construction of complex monuments and buildings.
Plato's "respect for artisanship," according to Glacken,
"...lead[s] to [the] general idea [of] man as a being who
can create order and beauty out of brute material, or more
broadly, who can control natural phenomenon with a
combination of intelligence and skill" (Glacken 1990, 46).
Aristotle refined the Socratic conception of nature as
ordered for man's use in his Politics.

Here, Aristotle

expresses the idea of purpose in nature, including the
relation of plants and animals to the need of man.
According to Aristotle:
In like manner we may infer that, after the
birth of animals, plants exist for their sake,
and that the other animals exist for the sake
of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if
not all, at least the greater part of them, for
food, and for the provision of clothing and
various instruments.
Now if nature makes
nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the
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inference must be made that she has made all
animals and plants
for the sake of man
(Aristotle 1920, 40).
In this anthropocentric conception of interrelationships in
nature, the distribution of plants and animals is directly
related to the needs and uses of man (Glacken, 48).
Aristotle's notion of the material world's subservience to
humankind is amplified by his acceptance of the Platonic
division of the soul from the material.

Spirit or soul not

only existed apart from the body, but was superior to
earthly materials and the body.
The fusion of Greek rationalism with Judaic and early
Christian thought provided the genesis of the idea of
wilderness that has come to rule Western civilization for
the past two millennia.

According to Oelschlaeger:

Christianity culminates earlier Mediterranean
[e.g. Jewish, Greek, Roman] ideas of the earth
as designed for human kind and is therefore the
conceptual
apotheosis
of
the
Neolithic
revolution. This assertion underscore the idea
that the roots of environmental crises are
buried far deeper than we usually think.
Indeed, we are compelled to recognize that
Christianity is no one thing but a combination
of historical determinants, including human
nature and the agricultural revolution, which
t ogether
introduced
a
historically
unprecedented direction to human relations with
wild nature:
the natural world came to be
conceived
as
valueless
until
humanized
(Oelschlaeger, 62).
With the Socratic-Platonic doctrine of the soul incorporated
into Christianity, Western civilization was set inexorably
on an anthropocentric course.

In this framework, humanity
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remained at the center of all things, and Western culture
and society became alienated from the natural world.

Judeo-

Christian faith claimed nothing from nature, for God alone
was important, and human attention shifted from the
intuitive, mystical, and physical to the supranatural and
transcendental (Oelschlaeger, 65).
Early Christian thinkers readily accepted this
worldview that desacrilized nature and placed humankind
above nature without hesitation.

What was important to

these thinkers was humankind's relationship with God and not
with the physical world which surrounded it.

The work of

Thomas Aquinas provides an example of the Greco/JudeoChristian synthesis.

In his Summa Theoloqica. Aquinas

writes:
For his disobedience to God, man was punished
by the disobedience of those creatures which
should be subject to him...Now all animals are
naturally subject to man.
This can be proved
in three ways.
First, from the order observed
by nature; for just as in the generation of
things
we
perceive
a
certain
order
of
procession
of
the
perfect
from
the
imperfect... so also is there order in the use
of natural things; thus the imperfect are for
the use of the perfect; as the plants make use
of the earth for their nourishment, and animals
make use of plants, and man makes use of both
plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping
with the order of nature, that man should be
master over animals....Secondly, this is proved
from the order of Divine Providence which
always governs inferior things by the superior.
Wherefore, as man, being made in the image of
God, is above other animals, these are rightly
subject to his government.
Thirdly, this is
proved from a property of man and of other
animals.
for we seen in the latter a certain
participated prudence of natural instinct, in
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regard to certain particular acts; whereas man
possesses a universal prudence as regards all
practical
matters.
Now
whatever
is
participated is subject to what is essential
and universal.
Therefore the subjection of
other animals to man is proved to be natural
(Aquinas 1913, 327).
Aquinas placed humans at the top of creation, arguing that
humans had been created in the image of their maker and
endowed with reason.

Reason, in turn, gave man domain over

all other nature.

Modernism and Wilderness
A discussion of wilderness and American traditions
toward wilderness would be incomplete without discussing the
impact of the paradigmatic shift to Modernism.

Modernism

refers to the historical movement beginning with the
Renaissance, and continuing through the present, in which
the peoples of Western Europe utilized those Western
traditions discussed above with science and technology in an
attempt to transform wilderness into industrialized
civilizations in an attempt to secure liberty and
prosperity.

According to William Connolly:

In modernity, the insistence upon taking charge
of the world comes into its own.
Nature
becomes a set of laws susceptible to human
knowledge, a deposit of resources for potential
use...
While
[this]
orientation
jostles
with...others for priority, [it does] place
nature at the disposal of humanity.
Human and
non-human nature become material to work on.
The world loses its earlier property as a text
upon which the will of God is inscribed and
through which humans can come to a more
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profound understanding of their proper place in
the order of things (Connolly 1988, 2).
Modernism, as a paradigm, therefore consists of a set of
perceptions regarding science, rationality, and nature that
have been established over a long period of time and
continues to reinforce humankind's ongoing attempts to
dominate nature in the pursuit of Modernism's aims.
Modernism is comprised of a number of historical
elements that were intertwined and interrelated in a complex
manner.

Among these processes were the Renaissance, the

Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the democratic,
industrial, and scientific revolutions.

Each tended to

reinforce the other as seen in the case of industrial
technology and capitalism.

The point here is not to

determine causation, but rather to explore the
interrelatedness of these historical, societal, and
political phenomena.
The key to understanding this era of the Western
experience is that these social, political, and historical
forces together challenged the power of the Catholic Church,
elevated reason over faith, and legitimated the pursuit of
worldly gain.

The industrial revolution, with its rising

material demands placed upon wilderness and reinforced in
its later phases by scientific technology, provided a means
to satisfy the economic aspirations of market oriented,
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capitalistic societies.

Modernism also effected an

ideological conversion of the wilderness into material
nature, both as an object of scientific inquiry and as the
means to fuel economic progress.

Modernism thus

institutionalized a profound homocentrism, still dominant in
the world, which may be characterized by a radical change in
humankind's sense of its own relative significance. "Unlike
Paleolithic and Neolithic people, and unlike the Greeks and
early Christians," writes Oelschlaeger, "modern human beings
think of themselves as existing without natural limits"
(Oelschlaeger, 69).
One of Modernism's most important contributions to the
Western traditional view of wilderness is the scientific
perspective.

According to Merchant:

Since
the
scientific
revolution
of
the
seventeenth century, the West has seen nature
primarily through the spectacles of mechanistic
science.
Matter is dead and inert, remaining
at rest or moving with uniform velocity in a
straight line unless acted upon by external
forces.
Change comes from outside as in the
operation of a machine. The world itself is a
clock,
adjustable
by
human
clock-makers.
Nature is passive and manipulable
(Merchant, 7).
Those thinkers who figured predominantly in providing
the foundation of the scientific revolution were Galileo,
Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, and Isaac Newton.

Considered

together, these thinkers represented a paradigm shift so
radical that the very meaning of the word of nature, and
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wilderness's place in it, changed.

"This conceptual

change," according to Oelschlaeger:
reflected in such twentieth-century usages as
'wild
nature'
as
distinct
from
'nature'
simpliciter. Nature is now believed to be the
object of scientific study, and nothing remains
in
it
of
anything
as
identifiably
wilderness...the idea of nature as animate and
living, where species seek to realize their
natural ends, has been displace by the idea of
a cold and lifeless mechanical nature.
In
explanatory terms, the Aristotelian syllogism
has been replaced by the causal explanation;
thus, natural motions were understood no longer
as the consequence of biological entelechy but
rather as the consequence of external forces
acting upon a body.
As Newton argued,
summarizing the modernist view of motion, every
action is the consequence of some other distant
action.
The modern mind has come to view
nature as nothing more than matter-in-motion,
whether planets, projectiles, or even animals
(Oelschlaeger, 77).
The mechanical worldview offered a strategy wherein the
empirical investigation of nature could proceed unimpeded by
the church.

God was interpreted as the clock-maker, the

universe as his clock, and science merely as a means to
disclose the underlying patterns of the mechanism.
Galileo led the way for the scientific age through his
conceptualization of the world as explicitly apart from the
world of concrete experience.

For Galileo the size and

shape of a physical body were real or objective —

that is,

attributes of a physical world presumed to exist
independently of human cognition (Oelschlaeger, 78).

Real

qualities become those that can be measured and subjected to
arithmetical manipulation.

The ideological offshoot of
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Modernism, scientism, views nature as an objective,
mechanical process and denies validity to either
nonreductionist or intuitive modes of consciousness as
legitimate avenues of knowledge and understanding.
Moveover, Galileo's proposal of the use of induction,
deduction, observation, and especially mathematics helped to
undermine Medieval worldviews.

Mathematical analysis

provided the revolution with its essential rigor of
scientific inquiry (Coppleston 1953, 20).
Francis Bacon represents the feeling of optimism in
man's capabilities over nature that was growing throughout
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Glacken, 471).
Bacon is seen as having formulated the concept of human
mastery over nature much more clearly than had been done
previously and to assign it a prominent place among
humankind's concerns.

According to William Leiss:

[The domination of nature] was wedded once
again to the predominant cultural force of that
time, namely, Christianity.
The idea was made
'respectable.'
Of course the notion of man's
dominion over the earth had always been a part
of the Judeo-Christian heritage...but in the
context
of the
emerging constellation
of
historical
factors
at
that
time
—
the
economic, social, political, scientific, and
technological changes which capitalism fused
together
into
a
system
of
expanding
productivity — this notion took on a whole new
significance.
The precise way in which Bacon
reformulated it was crucial, for Christianity's
hold on the European consciousness remained
strong even as the traditional social basis of
organized religion was being eroded away by
capitalism (Leiss 1972, 49).
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In Bacon's view religion and science were both instrumental
in an effort to reclaim that which had been lost with the
expulsion of humankind from Eden.

So expressed, Bacon

provided the formula whereby the idea of the mastery over
nature became widely acceptable.

Through the use of

science, humans could rescue themselves from the fall from
Paradise by the economic development and exploitation of
nature in building the "New Jerusalem."
Rene Descartes defined for the scientific revolution
and Modernism the idea of nature itself.

Descartes proposed

that the mind is distinct from the matter it might perceive
and that the natural world is a machine that can be broken
down into its component parts for analysis.

Like Bacon,

Descartes believed in the power of natural reason and that
such power could transform and modify nature itself.
Descartes most profound contribution may be seen in his
conceiving of the material world as a complex mechanism and
his insistence that an absolute understanding of that world
is possible.

Animals are considered mere machines,

incapable of feelings such as pain, and like machines, they
have use value only.

Descartes, along with Bacon, believed

that man might redeem himself from the fall by creation of a
heaven on earth through the use of science.
Isaac Newton represents a clear transition from the
Medieval to modernity by bringing the intellectual ferment
of the scientific revolution to its theoretical culmination
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(Oelschlaeger, 89).

Newton's physics was a culmination of

the long-held desire for a logical and absolute
understanding of the universe.

Through mathematics Newton's

mechanics elucidate the world experience as mathematical
repetitions, rendering it in a previously unperceived
manner.

With Newtonian physics came the potential to remake

the world according to humankind's designs and imagination
and in doing so, brought the promise that humankind could
free itself of its earthly misery.
The culmination of the scientific revolution of
Modernism manifested itself in the period known as the
Enlightenment.

During this period, a number of diverse

intellectual elements and historical forces were synthesized
into the powerful paradigm of Modernism and centered around
the industrial revolution.

Of the thinkers of the time,

Adam Smith and his theories remain perhaps the most
revealing of the period.
Smith's work, The Wealth of Nations, is the result of
his recognizing and synthesizing the various components of
Modernism into a comprehensive paradigm.

Through the use of

observation and reason, Smith recognized that the different
components of culture, technology, politics, and society all
interrelate in the production of economies.

There is in his

work the normative dimension of consumption as a condition
for human happiness.

According to Oelschlaeger:

Like
Bacon,
[Smith]
envisioned
a
'mundus
alter,' a world where the engine of economic
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growth drove society relentlessly forward in a
ceaseless expansion of production-consuxnption
cycle...Unlimited
growth
was
the
ethical
justification for capitalism, and the reason
why Smith believed it preferable to all other
forms of human economy (Oelschlaeger, 92).
Man's salvation, for Smith, lay in the industrial revolution
and it is this presupposition that the Enlightenment's
attitude towards wilderness and wild nature is manifest.
That which has value for man, in the world view of
Modernism,

is cultured and stripped of any of its wild

attributes.
The mechanistic philosophy developed by the natural
philosophers discussed above legitimated the capitalist
revolution and its domination of nature.

According to

Merchant:
Mechanical
metaphors
and the
rhetoric
of
Manifest Destiny became core concepts of a
modern philosophy that saw the world as a vast
machine that could be mathematically described,
predicted,
and
c o n t r o l l e d ...[S cience
constructed]
a
context
free,
value
free
knowledge
of
the
external
world.
As
constructed
by
the
seventeenthcentury
'fathers' of modern science, the mechanistic
model
served
to
legitimate
the
human
prediction, control, and manipulation of nature
(Merchant, 199).
As the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth, the
forces of history —

the scientific, democratic, and

industrial revolutions, the Enlightenment —

amalgamated

themselves into a cultural paradigm so powerful and
persuasive that it still rules Western society and its
institutions.
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The Western worldview toward wilderness and nature has
a long and complex history.

Although Greek tradition saw

nature as animated and self-moving, it separated the human
soul from the material.

Judeo-Christian views strengthened

the concept of separation and placed humans in a superior
position to the nature they inhabited.

Nature was becoming

merely a material resource for the earth's rational
creature.

With the advent of the scientific revolution came

the perception of the world and universe as vast machines
that could be simply understood if broken down into their
component parts.

Capitalism and democracy coalesced with

machine technology to effect the conversion of nature into
simple components in an economic formula, devoid of any
intrinsic value, possessing market value only.

Modernism

completes the intellectual divorce of humankind from nature
and defines nature and wilderness in terms of man's designs
upon it.

It is this "modern" tradition that the Europeans

brought with them to the New World that helped to define the
foundations of its dominant social paradigm.

CHAPTER 3
MODERNISM AND ITS CRITICS

Introduction
With the arrival of Western Europeans in the Americas
and their subsequent settlement, the European worldview as
developed by Modernism spread westward across the Atlantic.
This chapter discusses the impact of Modernism upon the
development of the traditional American attitude towards
wilderness, traces the beginnings of the literary,
philosophic, and scientific developments of the
preservationist and conservationist views toward wilderness,
and explores the evolution of the tension between Modernism
and its critics.

Traditional American Views Toward Wilderness
Alexis de Tocqueville provides in his classic work,
Democracy in America. an excellent introduction to the early
American sentiment towards wilderness.

De Tocqueville notes

that:
in Europe people talk a great deal of the wilds
of America, but the Americans themselves never
think about them; the are insensible to the
wonders of inanimate nature and they may be
said not to perceive the mighty forests that
surround them till they fall beneath the
36
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hatchet.
Their eyes are fixed upon another
sight...the...march across the wilds, draining
swamps, turning the course of rivers, peopling
solitudes, and subduing nature
(de Tocqueville 1945, 47) .
The attitude toward wilderness manifested itself on many
other American frontiers.

William Bradford, upon his

arrival in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, viewed it as a
"hideous and desolate wilderness."

Two centuries later fur-

trapper Alexander Ross, upon his arrival to the Columbia
River basin, recorded his despair in encountering a "gloomy,
dreary, and unhallowed wilderness"

(Nash, 24).

Wilderness

for wilderness' sake was never perceived as a value for the
American pioneer.
There were basically two components to the American
pioneers' bias against wilderness that came to dominate
traditional American views toward wilderness.

The first of

these was simply the physical threat to the pioneers'
survival. "Safety and comfort," according to Nash, "even
necessities like food and shelter, depended on overcoming
the wild environment...[t]he pioneer... lived too close to
wilderness for appreciation"

(Nash, 24).

The second

component to the bias against wilderness, and more germane
to this discussion, was the continuation of the Western
tradition of viewing nature's wildness as being the earthly
manifestation of Satan's power in a chaotic wasteland.

The

transformation of a wilderness from this chaos through the
use and design of science into civilization was the reward
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for humankind's sacrifices.

Humans, through the use of

reason and science could perfect an incomplete and unordered
natural world and free themselves from the misery of their
earthly existence.

Western expansion of civilization was

perceived as good in an age which idealized progress and
used civilization as measure of that progress.

In the

vocabulary of material progress and the paradigm of
Modernism, wilderness had meaning only as an obstacle
(Nash, 41).

Counterreaction to Modernism
Modernism, as with all paradigms, was not without its
challengers.

However, as Oelschlaeger notes, there was not,

nor is there now, one dominant alternative counter-paradigm
to Modernism.

Instead there were at least three

identifiable currents of criticism of Modernism and perhaps
one of the reasons Modernism still flourishes today:
literary, philosophical, and scientific counterreactions.
Each had important consequences upon American attitudes
toward wilderness.

The following discussion describes these

various reactions to the dominant paradigm of Modernism.

Scientific Counterreactions
The early scientific counter to Modernism was grounded
in an attempt to recast traditional religious beliefs in a
manner consistent with the advancing front of science and
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reason.

These counterreactions in science to Modernist

trends blended science with religion and philosophy.

As

Glacken points out, each of these was concerned with
fundamental questions such as the proofs of God's existence,
what were perceived as final causes in nature, and the
orderliness of nature or "teleology" (Glacken, 505).

This

early scientific counter was made up of individuals who
utilized scientific knowledge in an attempt to gain
scientific certainty for traditional Judeo-Christian
beliefs, such as a divine creator.

Scientific evidence

according to these scientists pointed to rational, reasoned
God as the final cause for all natural phenomena.

In spite

of these arguments for design in nature, positive science,
which argued for efficient rather than final cause and
viewed nature as a mechanism or machine, proved to be more
tenable than the uneasy alliance between science, religion
and philosophy.

The initial scientific counterreaction,

however was not without importance.

As discussed later, the

scientific counterreaction helped set the stage for the work
of Charles Darwin, who would in turn shatter many of
Modernism's long held scientific beliefs.

Literary Counterreactions
The literary alternative took shape in the form of the
early Romantic writers who valued an immediate, personal,
and affective relationship with nature and, like their
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physico-theologist counterparts in the scientific
counteraction, were defenders of the Christian faith in God.
According to Oelschlaeger:
To the Romantics nature was not a lifeless
machine, mere matter in motion, but a living
organism created by divine providence; they
believed that God's presence was revealed
through an aesthetic awareness of nature's
beauty...The poetic view of nature gravitated
toward wild and mysterious aspects, the felt
qualitative rather than measured quantitative
dimensions of experience (Oelschlaeger, 99).
The Romantic "Lake Poets", Lord Byron, Percy Shelley, and
Wordsworth, all perceived the society created by Modernism
and its search for material gain as inherently detrimental
to the individual and his freedom.

Romantics believed

humans were more than simple components or inputs in a
mechanistic, morally bankrupt, and valueless society.
Nash sees the Romantic appreciation of wilderness as
beginning in the cities where, free from the pressures of a
frontier living, the literary elite began to feel the first
resistance against the traditional Western response as
conditioned by the dominant paradigm.

The change in

attitude began in the change in European worldviews with the
advent of the scientific and industrial revolutions.
Nash:
Romanticism resists definition, but in general
it implies an enthusiasm for the strange,
remote, solitary, and mysterious. Consequently
in regard to nature Romantics preferred the
wild...Wilderness appealed to those bored or
with man
his weurku, it not only

an escape from society Put also was an

ideal stage for the Romantic individual to

For
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exercise the cult that he frequently made of
his own soul.
The solitude and total freedom
of the wilderness created a perfect setting for
either melancholy or exultation (Nash, 47).
In Europe, Jean-Jacques Rousseau articulated this seminal
appreciation for the wilderness condition.
Although his argument was not a call for humans to run
naked back into the woods, Rousseau, in his work Emile, does
argue for a blending of the primitive and wild qualities of
nature in the distorted "civilized life" of Western Europe
(Nash, 49). According to Rousseau:
Everything is good as it comes from the hands
of the Author of Nature;
but
everything
degenerates in the hands of man...He mingles
and confounds the climates, the elements, the
seasons; he overturns everything, disfigures
everything; he loves deformity, monsters; he
will have nothing as Nature made it, not even
man (Rousseau 1906, 1) .
"Nature," in this case, consists of the material and
physical world unmodified by human design, but remains as an
intelligent and infallible guide for human endeavors.
Rousseau's view:
We are born sensible, and from our birth we are
affected in different ways by the objects which
surround us. As soon as we have consciousness,
so to speak, of our sensations, we are disposed
to seek or to shun the objects which produce
them: first according as they are agreeable or
disagreeable to us; then,
according to the
congruity or the incongruity which we find
between ourselves and these objects;
and,
finally, according to the judgments which we
derive from them relative to the idea of
happiness or perfection which is given us by
the reason.
These dispositions are extended
and strengthened in proportion as we become
more susceptible and enlightened; but,

In
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constrained by our habits, they change more or
less
with
our
opinions.
Before
this
alteration, these dispositions are what I call
our nature.
It is, then, to these primitive
dispositions that everything should be referred
(Rousseau, 4).
With the publication of Emile. Rousseau sought to divest
society of its artificial and absurd forms through a return
toward primitive simplicity.
For Rousseau, society, its state, science, paradigms,
all culture, represented an oppressive force that was
suffocating and debasing the human spirit.

What was needed

for was a return to the natural state where culture and
happiness are inversely related.

In contrast to Hobbes,

Bacon, Locke, and Smith, Rousseau found virtue in a life led
closer to nature and its wilderness.

Leaving humans in

their natural condition, according to Rousseau, was not a
necessary evil.

It was the chains wrought by civilization

that placed man in opposition to one another.
Also found within the Romantic counterreaction to
Modernism is an intuitive, aesthetic reaction against
mechanistic materialism.

Nature for the Romantics could not

be perceived as a machine, broken down simply into its
constituent parts.

The science of the scientific and

industrial revolutions, in removing the observer from the
observed, also removed the observer from experience of
tangible sensations.

Scientific nature was stripped of

taste, sight, sound, and feeling to be left only with

quantifiable properties of mass, velocity, and repetition of
invariant patterns.

The Romantic aim was to end the use of

the abstract language of science and encourage the use of a
poetic nature that was considered alive, subjective, and the
source of aesthetic delight and philosophical inspiration.
The Romantic movement can be understood, then, as a reaction
that purposely took an aesthetic approach.

Unlike the

strictly philosophical reaction to Modernism, where such
thinkers as Spinoza and Schopenhauer systematically worked
through conceptual (epistomological, metaphysical, and
ethical)

issues, the Romantics were concerned with affective

immediacy:

they followed a direct intuitive route to a

realization of the unity of nature, a route which was to
have important implications in the development of American
attitudes towards wilderness in the mid-to-late nineteenth
century (Oelschlaeger, 113).
The Romantic movement sought to investigate and
discover man's relationship with nature and his place in it.
For example, Immanuel Kant provided insight to humankind's
relation with nature that espoused Romantic leanings.

In

Kant's earlier works, such as the Critique of Pure Reason,
the world is given over to the dominant paradigm of the time
and consigned to be viewed as a mechanism.

Humankind, Kant

argued, had achieved through physics a certain knowledge of
the phenomenal world that would be good for all people in
all places and times.

The rational mind, according to Kant,

44

could, therefore, perceive the world in the modern,
scientific perspectives provided by Newtonian physics.
In his later writing, however, and especially in his
Critique of Judgment, it is clear that Kant attempted to
reconcile the mechanistic with the intuitive and aesthetic
constructs of human consciousness.

In the Critique of

Judgment, Kant points out the inadequacies of reasoned
analogies which likened nature to a machine.

According to

Kant:
In a watch one part is the instrument by which
the movement of the others is effected, but one
wheel
is not the efficient cause of the
production of the other. One part is certainly
present for the sake of the other, but it does
not owe its presence to the agency of that
other...hence [a watch] does not itself replace
its parts of which it has been deprived
of... nor
does
it
repair
its
own
casual
disorders.
But these are all things which we
are justified in expecting from organized
nature.
An organized being is, therefore, not
a mere machine.
For a machine has solely
motive
power,
whereas
an organized being
possesses inherent formative power, and such,
moreover, as it can impart to material devoid
of it — material which it organizes.
This,
therefore,
is a self-propagating formative
power,
which cannot be explained by the
capacity of movement alone, that is to say, by
mechanism (Kant 1961, 22).
Kant's move away from the conception of nature as
mechanism in the Critique of Judgment is ultimately a
legitimation of a poetic nature.

Kant maintained the

autonomy of aesthetic judgment from the rational in the
human mind and in doing so suggests that there exists an
independent realm of the aesthetic which is quite unique
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from other realms of morality and of nature
(Megill 1985, 12).

This defense of the aesthetic Kant based

upon "the indeterminate idea of the supersensible within us"
—

intuition (Kant, 208).

While defending the aesthetic as

a legitimate form of cognition, separate and equal to pure
reason, Kant defended implicitly the use of intuition as a
conceptual framework.

As a result of Kant's work, nature no

longer needed to be viewed only in rational, mechanical
light.

Aesthetic, spiritual, and intuitive constructs of

nature gained legitimacy.

Philosophical Counterreactions
The foremost philosophical critic of Modernism was the
Dutch-Jewish philosopher, Benedict Spinoza.

Classical

science, Spinoza argues, prevents the possibility of humans
recognizing their relationship between themselves and
nature.

Since humankind was bound within the constructs of

nature, humankind's happiness depends upon its ability to
recognize this relationship.

Spinoza accepted science's

framework of inquiry as a legitimate, comprehensive mode of
inquiry, but questioned its failure to consider the relation
between humans as agents in the world and nature itself.

He

therefore sought to devise an ethical framework for
humankind grounded in nature which would supersede any
disruptions resulting from scientific knowledge and
technology.

In effect, what classical science had denied —
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the relation between humans as ethical agents and nature as
the environment in which they acted —

Spinoza hoped to

restore (Oelschlaeger, 122).
Spinoza based his ethics on the principle of the unity
of nature.

Indeed, much of the work preceding and including

his Ethics was dedicated to the purpose of reducing the
universe to a unified and uniformed whole governed by
universal and unchangeable laws.

According to Harry

Wolfson:
That philosophers before him had fallen short
of the attainment of this purpose — that they
had broken up the universe into discontinuous
parts by positing a spiritual God as distinct
from the material world, and correspondingly in
man a spiritual soul as distinct from a
material body, with the resulting beliefs of
design in nature and free will in man — was in
his opinion due to a logical inconsistency in
their thinking (Wolfson 1948, 33).
In separating both God and man from the physical and
material, these philosophers, Spinoza argued, could not
logically achieve a unified universe.

According to Spinoza,

one substance cannot be produced by another substance
(Spinoza 1933, 41).

His corollary to this proposition,

then, is that there is nothing can be produced by anything
external to itself:

something cannot come from nothing.

The main-point then of his corollary is that if the material
world were produced by an immaterial God, something would be
produced from nothing.

Rather than trying to work within

this conception of God nature, Spinoza proposed both God and
humankind be placed under and within, not outside and above,
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the universal rule of nature and thus establishing its unity
(Wolfson, 332).

Early American Counterreactions
Much of the reaction to the Modernist paradigm found
its way into American thought and letters of the early and
mid-nineteenth century.

In doing so, these critics helped

in the development of the early elements of wilderness
appreciation.

In America, as in Europe, appreciation for

wilderness was based upon Romanticism and its use of the
sublime (the association of God with wild nature).

This

appreciation found its way into the thought of those members
of American society who were usually not involved directly
with wilderness as was the pioneer —

urban elites.

According to Nash, William Byrd II of Virginia is one
of the earliest American Romantics.

Educated in London,

Byrd returned to his family plantation in Virginia but never
lost interest in English social and literary trends,
including the Romantic counterreaction to the Modernist
paradigm.

While working as a commissioner in a surveying

operation to establish Virginia's boundary with North
Carolina, Byrd began to collect his thoughts about the
Virginia wilderness and published them in his book, History
of the Dividing Line.
revolutionary,

While this work can hardly be called

it does offer the first extensive American
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commentary putting wilderness in a more favorable light as
seen in the following passage:
Our landlord had a tolerable good house and
clean furniture, and yet we could not be
tempted to lodge in it. We chose rather to lie
in the open field, for fear of growing too
tender. A clear 'sky, spangled with stars, was
our canopy, which being the last thing we say
before we fell asleep gave us magnificent
dreams.
The truth of it is, we took so much
pleasure in that natural kind of lodging, that
I think at the foot of the account of mankind
are great losers by the luxury of feather-beds
and
warm
apartments.
The
curiosity
of
beholding so new and withal so sweet a method
of encamping, brought one of the senators of N.
Carolina to make us a...visit (Byrd 1929, 58).
Byrd portrayed the expedition into "this great Wilderness"
as a delightful adventure.

It is important to note,

however, that this nascent Romantic appreciation, the
beginnings of American appreciation of wilderness, and much
of the tradition that was to develop out of this small
movement, was seldom ever without qualification.

Byrd, as

with many of those who supported his views, idealized most
often the economically useful, pastoral, and controlled
experience of nature (Nash, 53).
A particular theme of the American Romantic movement
was the sense of freedom that vast expanses of wilderness
offered.

In his volume The Adirondack:

or Life in the

Woods. Joel Headley at first expressed the typical Romantic
reaction of awe, terror, sublimity, and beauty when
confronted with the Adirondacks range.

Headley went on to

assert that he loved "the freedom of the wilderness and the
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absence of conventional forms there" (Nash, 62).

Santa Fe

trader Josiah Gregg, following his final trip to the
Southwest in 1839, wrote:
I have striven in vain to reconcile myself to
the even tenor of civilized life in the United
States; and have sought in its amusements and
its society a substitute
for those high
excitements which have attached me so strongly
to Prairie life.
Yet I am almost ashamed to
confess that scarcely a day passes without my
experiencing a pang of regret I am not now
roving at large upon those western plains. Nor
do I find my taste peculiar; for I have hardly
known a man, who has ever become familiar with
the kind of life which I have led for so many
years,
that has not relinquished it with
regret...The wild, unsettled and independent
life of the Prairie trader, makes perfect
freedom from nearly every kind of social
dependence an absolute necessity of being...The
exchange of this untrammelled condition — this
sovereign
independence,
for
a
life
in
civilization, where both [humankind's] physical
and moral freedom are invaded at every turn, by
the
complicated
machinery
of
social
institutions, is certainly to commend itself to
but few, — not even to all those who have been
educated to find their enjoyments in the arts
and elegancies peculiar to civilized society; - as is evinced by the frequent instances of
men of letters, of refinement and of wealth,
voluntarily abandoning society for a life upon
the Prairies, or in the still more savage
mountain wilds (Gregg 1966, 219).
However, Romantics feared leaving civilization totally
behind.

Rather, they preferred to keep a foot in each

realm, taking advantage of the virtues offered by each.
While appreciation of wilderness existed, it was rarely, if
ever, wholly unqualified.

Romanticism had cleared enough of

the old assumptions away to permit a more or less favorable
attitude toward wilderness without entirely eliminating the
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instinctive fear and hostility a wilderness condition had
produced.
In summary, the roots of traditional American
attitudes concerning wilderness were conditioned by the
paradigm of Modernism.

With the arrival of Europeans upon

the shores of the New World, so too came their world view
and the initial reaction to the wilderness in which they
found themselves.

Traditional notions of progress,

development, domination, and the conception of nature as a
mechanism all helped in the development of the dominant
paradigm in American society and its subsequent treatment of
wilderness.

However, as the European scientific,

philosophical, and literary counterreactions to Modernism
spread throughout the Continent, they also found
articulation in the New World in the form of the American
Romantic movement.

The seeds of discontent were sown in the

fertile ground of urban elites whose experience with
wilderness was more limited than that of their pioneer
counterparts.

From this seminal Romantic countermovement

rose America's first true philosophic movement,
Transcendentalism, and one of the most important voices in
the development of Romantic appreciation of wilderness in
America —

Henry David Thoreau.

CHAPTER 4

THOREAU AND ROMANTIC WILDERNESS

Introduction
The Romantic movement in America, reflecting the
European counterreaction to the paradigm of Modernism, had
profound implications for the American designs upon
wilderness.

This chapter discusses further the

repercussions of the literary and philosophical reaction
upon Transcendentalism and, in turn, its impact upon
possibly the most pivotal figure in the development of the
American wilderness appreciation —

Henry David Thoreau.

Transcendentalism
To understand the thought of Henry Thoreau it is
necessary to discuss first the American Transcendental
movement and the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson.

In her work,

Transcendentalism as a Social Movement. Anne Rose notes that
much of the academic interest in the Transcendental movement
focuses upon its intellectual component.

According to Rose:

Here the Transcendentalists helped demonstrate
that America had a native intellectual and
literary tradition, and the documents Perry
Miller collected in The Transcendentalists
(1950) are indeed convincing proof of the force
and originality of their thinking
51
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...[there is a] strong case...made for the
Transcendentalists
as
leading
thinkers
. . . [whose] heart and soul was the faith that
the normal democratic process could be trusted
to yield social justice...(Rose 1981, viii).
Transcendentalism was a religious, philosophical, and
literary movement and located in the history of American
religious thought as post-Unitarian and freethinking, as
Kantian and idealistic in philosophy, and Romantic and
individualistic in literature.

The Transcendental

counteraction began as a quest for new ways of conceiving
the human condition to replace Modernist concepts that no
longer elicited any conviction for many.
"Transcendentalism," according to Paul Boiler, "in short,
was mainly an enterprise undertaken by bright young
Unitarians to find meaning, pattern and purpose in a
[modern] universe no longer managed by a genteel and amiable
Unitarian God" (Boiler 1974, xx).
For those who participated in Transcendentalism, the
experience was one of wonder and joy they found in the
universe all around them.

Transcendentalism meant breaking

out of conditioned, habitualized ways of conceiving things
and trying to view reality with what has been called the
"innocent eye."

"In the tradition of Idealist such as Plato

and Kant," writes Nash, "the American Transcendentalists
postulated the existence of a reality higher than the
physical"

(Nash, 85).

There was for the Transcendentalists,

as their name implies, a higher realm of spiritual truth and
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vitality that existed apart from the lower world of the
material.

According to Rose, "[the Transcendentalists] had

hoped to save Christianity from historical oblivion and to
give it personal immediacy by pointing out the identity of
Gospel truth and intuition" (Rose, 38).
Ralph Waldo Emerson, recognized as the father of
American Transcendentalism, gave the best explanation of
what the word meant in his lecture "The Transcendentalist."
According to Emerson:
What is popularly called Transcendentalism
among us, is Idealism; Idealism as it appears
in 1842.
As thinkers, mankind have ever
divided
into two
sects,
Materialists
and
Idealists...The materialist insists on facts,
on history, on the force of circumstances, and
the animal wants of man; the idealist on the
power of Thought and of Will, on inspiration,
on miracle, on individual culture.
These two
modes of thinking are both natural, but the
idealist concedes that his way of thinking is
in higher nature...it is well known to most of
my audience that the Idealism of the present
day acquired the name Transcendental from the
term used by Immanuel Kant, of Konigsberg, who
replied to the skeptical philosophy of Locke,
which insisted that there was nothing in the
intellect which was not previously in the
experience of the senses, by showing that there
was a very important class of ideas imperative
forms, which did not come by experience, but
through which experience was acquired;
that
these were intuitions of the mind itself; and
he denominated them Transcendental forms.
The
extraordinary profoundness and precision of
that man's thinking have given vogue to his
nomenclature, in Europe and America, to that
extent that whatever belongs to the class of
intuitive thought popularly called at the
present day 'Transcendental'
(Emerson 1983, 193).
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Kant was, in short, the wellspring of the American
Transcendentalist movement.

Kant believed that human

reason, inevitably seeks to know what ultimate reality is;
it tries to unify the concepts provided by the Understanding
(transformation of concrete concepts into the abstract) in
order to produce metaphysical or religious ideas that will
explain the universe as a whole in its fundamental character
(Boiler, 39).
Kant's influence upon Transcendentalist thinkers
resulted in their placing faith in intuition and not the
pure reason of Modernism.

This faith in intuition can be

seen in the Transcendentalist faith in the natural-material
world.

Through the use of intuition a natural object, if

rightly seen and construed, would reflect universal
spiritual truths.

Nature was at least the mirroring of

higher laws that emanated from God, if not the actual
embodiment of God himself (Nash, 85). Boiler argues that
this in turn provided alternative moral and religious ideals
to the society of the age.

According to Boiler:

The
[Transcendentalists]
were
absolutely
certain that these ideals were grounded in the
very nature of things and that efforts to live
by them made for more fruitful and authentic
living than the mechanistic philosophy of the
Lockeans (Boiler, 63).
From the Transcendentalist perspective, humankind
finds itself rooted in the material world of a universe
divided between object and essence.

However, because of
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their possession of a soul or spirit, humans are able to
transcend their physical condition.

According to Nash:

Using intuition or imagination (as distinct
from
rational
understanding),
man
might
penetrate to spiritual truths.
In the same
manner he could discover his own correspondence
with the divine being and appreciate his
capacity for moral improvement (Nash, 85).
In its perspective on humans and nature,
Transcendentalism had profound implications for the meaning
of the American wilderness.

Transcendentalism, as a

doctrine, placed God and the divine back into nature.
Nature was no longer merely the result of God's handiwork,
but the actual vehicle through which humans could become
aware of and in touch with the divine.

In theory,

Transcendentalists disabused themselves of the earlier ideas
of wilderness as a wicked domain and regarded wilderness and
its environment as a medium through which spiritual truths
could be seen in a less inhibited manner. In his work, On
Nature. what is commonly referred to as the
Transcendentalist's manifesto,

Emerson makes this point

clear:
The stars awaken a certain reverence, because
though always present, they are inaccessible;
but
all
natural
objects
make
a
kindred
impression, when the mind is open to their
influence.
Nature
never
wears
a
mean
appearance. Neither does the wisest man extort
her secret, and lose his curiosity by finding
out all her perfection. Nature never becomes a
toy to a wise spirit.
The flowers, the
animals, the mountains, reflected the wisdom of
his best hour, as much as they had delighted
the simplicity of his childhood. When we speak
of nature in this manner, we have a distinct
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but most poetical sense in mind.
We mean the
integrity of
impression made by manifold
natural
objects.
It
is
this
which
distinguishes the stick of timber of the wood
cutter, from the tree of the poet.
In the
wilderness, I find something more dear and
connate that in the streets of villages... in
the woods we return to reason and faith
(Emerson, 9).
This discussion of Transcendentalism introduces the
thoughts and attitudes that helped shape the Thoreauvian
worldview.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume

Thoreau to be a mere epigone of Emerson's thought.

Emerson

and the other Transcendentalists unquestionably left their
mark on Thoreau, but Transcendentalism alone does not
provide an adequate framework for understanding Thoreau's
idea of wilderness.

According to Oelschlaeger:

Setting
out
from
his
transcendental
inclinations,
Thoreau
developed
through
ceaseless
reflective
effort
a
remarkable
philosophical position revolving around the
ideas of self, society, and wilderness and the
interrelations among them...[Emerson's]
key
contribution was helping Thoreau to establish a
belief that nature can be known through the
immediate activity of inquiring consciousness
(or, alternatively,
an absolute separation
between consciousness and nature does not
exist).
This transcendental axiom, or first
principle, was at the heart of the Emersonian
philosophical
legacy.
But comparison
of
Emerson's
Nature
and
other
relevant
writings...with
Thoreau's
mature
work
underscores the differences in their use of the
imagination.
Unlike Emerson, Thoreau uses
transcendentalism as a departure point, that
is, as justifying the intuitive apprehension
and active questioning of nature
(Oelschlaeger, 134).
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This difference is crucial in understanding Thoreau's moving
beyond a Transcendental perspective of nature and wilderness
(Rose, xi).
For Emerson, consciousness is nothing more than a
vehicle to carry man toward a pre-existing conclusion.
Nature is not a philosophical inquiry but a literary
exercise designed to rest a pre-established belief in God on
rational, rather than scriptural, footing.

For Emerson

then, the emphasis is placed upon the human spirit and its
relationship with God.

According to James McIntosh:

Emerson urges his readers to study nature by
living in it and learning to read God's
uncorrupted revelation imprinted secretly on
it.
On the other hand, Emerson keeps saying
that
nature
is
insignificant
in
itself...'Nature is but an image or imitation
of wisdom, the last thing of the soul; Nature
being a thing which doth only do, but not
know...'
In
general,
the
intention
of
Emerson's book is not simply to urge a return
to nature, but to show how to bring nature
under the way of man's spirit, so that the
universe may at last be entirely spiritual
(McIntosh 1974, 30).
The conceptual focal point for Emerson was not nature or
wilderness —

they were mere tools in the effort to achieve

spirituality, not an end or good in themselves.

Henry David Thoreau and the Romantic Position
A discussion of transcendentalism alone is not enough
to understand the thought of Thoreau.

"As with all first-

rate minds," writes Oelschlaeger, " [Thoreau's] cannot be
reduced to the ideas of his progenitors.

Thoreau asks
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questions and finds interrelations between the human species
and nature about which Emerson never dreamed”
(Oelschlaeger, 136).

Rather than attempting to "build a

kingdom of man over nature," Thoreau seeks a partnership of
equals with it, where nature might foster the poetic in man
and man in turn treats nature as a single, living,
existential being (McIntosh, 34).

It is Thoreau's

attraction to nature and its wild attributes that set him
apart from Emerson.
Emerson's ideas, however, led Thoreau to make a
extraordinary investment in the idea of nature.

The

principle that humans may in fact correspond with or
discover themselves through a relationship with nature
"enabled [Thoreau] to think about all the natural life that
came into his ken, whether it was beautiful or ugly, wild or
tame, exhilarating or boring"

(McIntosh, 37).

At the same

time, however, Thoreau was strained to accept
transcendentalism wholeheartedly because of the ambiguities
that he felt it held toward nature.
developed a double program —
spiritual and physical realms.

As a result, Thoreau

to live intensely in the
According to McIntosh:

[These] two lives pull against each other in
his work.
The theory also make him acutely
aware that he as a conscious seeker was
separate from nature. And finally, the theory
covertly instilled in him the doubt that nature
exists, a doubt that consorted uneasily in his
mind with his acute appreciation of nature's
presence (McIntosh, 37).
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There are, therefore, contradictions in Thoreau's views
toward nature.

Thoreau's views regarding nature must be

approached with the understanding that they are the result
of a complex tension between the creative force of his
intuition (that nature and man exist in symbiosis) and the
rational force of his ideal logic, a logic that questions
the benevolence and even the existence of nature.
There is a second factor shaping Thoreau's attitude
towards wilderness —

his opinion of civilization.

As Nash

points out:
By mid-century American life had acquired a
bustling tempo and materialistic tone that left
Thoreau and many of his contemporaries vaguely
disturbed and insecure.
To be sure, the
official faith in progress ran strong. Yet the
idea that a technological civilization and the
pursuit of progress was disrupting older,
better patterns of living could not be entirely
set aside (Nash, 87).
The development of Thoreau's wilderness philosophy must
therefore be considered more meaningful when juxtaposed
against this sense of discontent with society.
Thoreau's conception of the value of wilderness is a
result of vigorous self examination and a lifetime of
primary experiences with nature.

Not only did he live for

two years alongside Walden Pond, but he ranged widely around
New England, Maine, and Canada.

For Thoreau, the presence

of wild nature was of utmost importance.

Unlike many of his

Romantic contemporaries, Thoreau was not satisfied in only
articulating some appreciation for wilderness.

Thoreau

60

grounded his argument in the idea that wilderness was the
source of vigor, inspiration, and strength for man's
physical as well as spiritual well being.

According to

Thoreau:
Life consists with wildness. The most alive is
the wildest.
Not yet subdued by man, its
presence refreshes him. One who is not pressed
forth incessantly and never rested from his
labors, who grew fast and made infinite demands
on life, would always find himself in a new
country or wilderness, and surrounded by the
raw material of life (Thoreau 1977, 611).
Loss of contact with the wild, leaves humans, their culture
and society less than whole.
Thoreau's inclinations toward nature are recorded in
the Natural History of Massachusetts, considered to be one
of the first instances of his nature writing.

In it, as

seen in the following passage, Thoreau diverged from
mainline Transcendentalists:
In society you will not find health, but in
nature.
Unless our feet at least stood in the
midst of nature, all our races would be pale
and livid. Society is always diseased, and the
best is more s o ... The doctrines of despair, of
spiritual or political tyranny or servitude,
were never taught by such as shared the
serenity of nature...We fancy that this din of
religion, literature, and philosophy, which is
heard
in
pulpits,
lyceums,
and
parlors,
vibrates through the universe,
and is as
catholic a sound as the creaking of the earth's
axle; but if a man sleep soundly, he will
forget it all between sunset and dawn
(Thoreau 1977, 33).
Thoreau, with such writing, was not apt to make many friends
or wield much influence among New England's
Transcendentalists.
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With the writing of Natural History. Thoreau manifests
his predilection for the critical.
left unturned.

No axiom or opinion was

Thoreau*s iconoclasm led him to another

important critique:

his criticism of the scientific method.

Not only did his critique question the very method through
which the Transcendentalists hoped to reveal the eternal
laws of nature, but question the Cartesian-Newtonian
paradigm itself.

Thoreau writes in Natural History:

Wisdom does not inspect, but behold.
We must
look a long time before we can see.
Slow are
the beginnings of philosophy. He has something
demoniacal in, who can discern a law or a
couple of two facts...The true man of science
will
know nature
better
by
his
finer
organization; he will smell, taste, see, hear,
feel, better than other men.
His will be a
deeper and finer experience.
We do not learn
by inference and deduction and the application
of mathematics to philosophy, but by direct
intercourse and sympathy.
It is with science
as with ethics, —
we cannot know truth by
contrivance and method; the Baconian is as
false as any other, an with all the helps of
machinery and the arts, the most scientific
will
still be the healthiest and friendliest
man,
and possess a more
perfect...wisdom
(Thoreau 1977, 56).
Natural History was Thoreau*s attempt to revive a more
primitive awareness of the natural world and to show that a
nonmediated or scientific encounter with wilderness provides
humans with the raw material to gain such awareness.
According to Oelschlaeger, this is a legacy of idealism and
Romanticism unrealized in Emerson's Nature.
For Thoreau then, wilderness provided a reservoir of
the raw material needed for humankind to regain its
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primitive awareness.

However, like Emerson's, Thoreau's

attention was upon the benefits of nature upon humans.
Nature is a tool for humankind to utilize in order to
maintain and develop its spirit.

According to Thoreau:

The poet's, commonly, is not a logger's path,
but woodman's.
The logger and pioneer have
preceded him, like John the Baptist; eaten the
wild honey, it may be, but the locusts also;
banished the decaying wood and the spongy
mosses which feed on it, and built hearths and
humanized Nature for him.
But there are
spirits of a yet more liberal culture, to whom
no simplicity is barren.
These are not only
stately pines, but fragile flowers, like the
orchises...which derive their nutriment from
the crudest mass of peat.
These remind us,
that, not only for strength, but for beauty,
the poet must, from time to time, travel the
logger's path and the Indian's trail, to drink
at some new and more bracing fountain of the
Muses, far in the recesses of the wilderness
(Thoreau 1985, 712).
Wilderness for Thoreau was essential to humans for it
symbolized the untapped potential in every individual.
Thoreau urged humans to explore the wild without, in an
effort to facilitate the exploration of the wild nature
within.
Thoreau, like Emerson, represents a transition.
Emerson and the Transcendentalists provided the necessary
link between the counterreaction to Modernism occurring in
Europe with the seminal American movement.

Emerson invested

Thoreau with a great appreciation of nature's ability to
help humanity correspond with its true nature.

Thoreau, in

turn, sought to abandon the use of Modernism's paradigm.
Wild nature and the opportunity it provides for humans to
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explore their inner-self through the use of intuition rather
than rationality remained a lasting theme for Thoreau and
marks his departure from the Transcendentalist to a
Thoreauvian world view.

This view, however, was not wholly

unqualified.
"While Thoreau was unprecedented in his praise of the
American wilderness," writes Nash, "his enthusiasm was not
undiluted; some of the old antipathy and fear lingered even
in his thought.

Encountering the Maine woods underscored

it" (Nash, 90).

His journey to the Maine wilderness,

especially his encounter with Mt. Ktaadn, thoroughly
convinced Thoreau that the Transcendentalist's notion of
nature and the world existing for human use was wrong.

The

wilderness Maine presented the uninitiated Thoreau with a
view of the world that was vast, wild, and in Thoreau's
words,

"grim."

The landscape was "savage" and "dreary."

Where he once exalted in the solitude of the woods
surrounding Walden Pond, he found the woods of Maine
intolerably lonesome, as seen in the following passage:
It was vast, Titanic, and such as man never
inhabits...inhuman Nature has got him at a
disadvantage, caught him alone, and pilfers him
of some of his divine faculty.
She does not
smile on him as in the plains.. .Nature was here
something
savage
and
awful,
though
beautiful...This was that Earth of which we
have
heard,
made
out
of
Chaos
and
Old
Night...There was there felt the presence of a
force not bound to be kind to man.
It was a
place for heathenism and superstitious rites, - to be inhabited by men nearer of kin to the
rocks and to wild animals than we
(Thoreau 1985, 640).
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Ktaadn awakened Thoreau to what he perceived as nature's
darker side.

While Walden represents the positive in

nature, Thoreau's writings regarding his Mt. Ktaadn
experience reveal that nature is not without its negative
aspects.
Thoreau's experience in Maine, however, is not without
its benefits either.

According to Oelschlaeger:

Positively viewed, the position developed in
'Ktaadn'
is
antithetical
to
Emerson's
philosophy,
the
final
step
in
Thoreau's
development
from
[TJranscendentalism
to
a
genuine relationship with the universe.
His
writings hereafter carry the mark of his
singular experiences, of his unique vantage
point on the wilderness, and of his genius.
More important,
the encounter with Ktaadn
sharpens
Thoreau's
understanding
of
the
interrelations
between
humankind
and
nature...By the time he returned to Walden he
was
enroute
to
developing...a
profound
revolutionary
perspective
on
nature
(Oelschlaeger, 149).
Walden helps form the heart of Thoreau's wilderness
philosophy, outlining both the critical —

his continuing

critique of Modernism's paradigms and its conventional
wisdom —

and the positive —

his recognition of the

pervasive continuities between the human and the natural —
sides of his thought (Oelschlaeger, 168).

Thoreau's

experience with Mt. Ktaadn presented him with the problem of
having to rectify his sense of the separateness of humankind
from nature and its love for nature.

As Nash describes, how

was it possible to secure the advantages of civilization
without suffering from any of its disadvantages?

For
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Thoreau the answer lay in an Aristotlean golden mean:

the

vitality and introspection offered by wilderness balanced by
the sensitivity and intellectual and moral growth that
characterized his ideal view of civilization.

The ideal

person or society occupied a middling, or to use Nash's
spectrum approach, a pastoral position, drawing on both the
wild and the refined.

The essential requirement for society

was to maintain contact with both civilization and
wilderness (Nash, 92).
Thoreau's impact American attitudes and ideas
regarding wilderness may be considered two-fold.

First, in

providing a philosophic defense of wilderness, Thoreau gave
the American idealization of the pastoral a new foundation.
According to Nash:
Previously most Americans had revered the
rural, agrarian condition as a release from
both wilderness and from high civilization.
They stood, so to speak, with both feet in the
center
of
the
spectrum
of
environments.
Thoreau...arrived at the middle by straddling.
He rejoiced in the extremes and, by keeping a
foot in <each, believed he could extract the
best of both worlds...According to Thoreau,
wildness and refinement were not fatal extremes
but equally beneficent influences Americans
would do well to blend (Nash, 94).
The second important aspect is Thoreau's identifying
the necessity of wild nature to maintain the vitality of the
human spirit.'

This is best seen in his essay Walking where

Thoreau writes:
I wish to speak a word for Nature, for absolute
freedom and wildness, as contrasted with a
freedom and culture merely civil, — to regard
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man as an inhabitant, or a part and parcel of
nature,
rather
than
a
member
of
s o c i e t y ... Nowadays
almost
all
man's
improvements, so called, as the building of
houses and the cutting down of the forest and
of all the large trees, simply deform the
landscape, and make it more and more tame and
cheap...what I have been preparing to say is,
that in Wildness is the preservation of the
World...From the forest and wilderness come the
tonics and barks which brace mankind.
The
story of Romulus and Remus being suckled by a
wolf is not a meaningless fable. The founders
of every state which has risen to eminence have
drawn their nourishment and vigor from a
similar wild source...In short all good things
are wild and free (Thoreau 1977, 592).
Thoreau's essential insight here is nourishment a communion
with nature can bestow upon the individual and society.
Wilderness provides the essential mechanism through which
the individual's and, in turn, society's spiritual health
and vitality is maintained.

The loss of wilderness

threatens the loss of this mechanism and subsequently the
loss of a society's necessary spiritual health.
Thoreau's work represents a transition.

His is a move

away from Emerson's theorizing and abstract treatment of
nature.

Here Thoreau's genius lies not in a retreat from

civilization but rather in an affirmation of the reality of
an organic process and humankind's inextricable linkage.with
this process.

Thoreau demonstrates through his writings his

affinity with the iconoclast and in doing so recognizes the
limitations of Modernism's scientific worldview.
to Oelschlaeger:

According
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his
intuitive
grasp
of
the
evolutionary
character of the cosmos, and the intertwining
of matter, life, and consciousness in the human
animal, has been vindicated, first by Darwin
and later by ethology, human ecology, cultural
anthropology,
and
cultural
geography
(Oelschlaeger, 171).
Thoreau's notions of man, civilization, and wilderness
are important here in that they came to form the foundation
of the Romantic arguments for wilderness preservation.
Arguments for the protection of wilderness by Romantic
"preservationists" centered upon the spiritual and aesthetic
qualities that wilderness offered society.

By their

definition, these arguments stood in clear contrast to the
materialistic/capitalistic claims upon wilderness brought
forth by the modern,

industrial interests of the time —

interests that would come to be defended by the
conservationist.

CHAPTER 5

THE SCIENTIFIC COUNTERREACTION

Introduction
Previous chapters have identified the dominant social
paradigm, its impact upon traditional American views towards
wilderness, and the literary and philosophical elements of
the counterreaction to Modernism.

This chapter explores the

scientific thought championed by Modernism, the scientific
counterreactions, and the impact of this scientific
counterreaction on the conservation movement.

The Roots of Modernism's Science
"The eighteenth-century," writes Donald Worster, "the
age of Reason,

[as] it is often called, still astonishes us

with its fertility of imagination" (Worster 1985, 2)

Much

of what modern society has become today can be traced
directly to the thought and philosophies that evolved during
this century.

Much of the thinking that evolved from the

eighteenth-century looked with envy toward what the natural
sciences had achieved:

theoretical elegance and precision

leading to prediction and causal control.
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To understand the scientific counterreaction to
Modernism, the following discussion briefly surveys the
essentials of the scientific paradigm that are included in
the idea of Modernism.

A discussion of these scientific

essentials starts with a discussion of Classical Greek
thought, especially that of Aristotle and his theory of
matter and motion.
According to Aristotle, matter remained motionless or
in a state of rest unless acted upon.

A stone that is

unhewn remains unhewn so far as the stone is concerned:

it

does not hew itself, nor does a hewn stone build itself into
a house (Coppleston 1960, 312).

How then does change occur

from Aristotle's point of view?

In the modern mind, the

cause of change must be a previous change, and that, if the
universe were static, it would remain so.

In an Aristotlean

understanding of motion, according to Bertrand Russell:
we must take account of what he says about
causes.
There are, according to him, four
kinds
of
causes,
which
were
called,
respectively, material, formal, efficient, and
final. Let us take...the man who is making the
statue.
The material cause of the statue is
the marble, the forma 1 cause isthe essence of
the statue to be produced, the efficient cause
is the contact of the chisel with the marble,
and the final cause
is the
end that the
sculptor has in view.
In modern terminology,
the word 'cause' would be confined to the
efficient cause...[the] final cause...supplies
a purpose for change, which is essentially an
evolution towards the likeness of God (Russell
1946, 191).
It is important simply to understand that for Aristotle,
change depended upon the notion of a "mover" (God) who
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provided the impetus for change (the efficient cause of
first cause) and the purpose for that change (final cause).
Each of these views of change would have profound impact
upon later Western thought, particularly that of the
Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the scientific
revolution.
The scientific revolution inspired a veritable
explosion of knowledge; never had such a tool for production
of knowledge, such a method of inquiry, been loosed upon the
world (Oelschlaeger,■100).

Renaissance scientists were

primarily concerned about knowledge for its own sake.

"But

at the same time," observes Coppleston:
it was a characteristic of some Renaissance
thinkers to emphasize the practical fruits of
knowledge.
The new scientific discoveries and
the opening up of the new world naturally
suggested a contrast between a knowledge of
nature, gained by study of her laws and making
possible a use of nature for man's benefit, and
the older abstract discipline which seemed
devoid of practical utility
(Coppleston 1953, 21).
Ultimately the driving spirit of the Renaissance expressed a
shift of emphasis away from the other-worldly to the more
mundane and from man's dependence upon nature to his
creative control over it (Coppleston 1953, 250).

Galileo and Efficient Cause
Control over nature began with the revolutionary shift
from an organismic to a mechanistic paradigmatic view of
nature.

This revolution began with Galileo.

Galileo
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represents the focal shift from the scientific observer
within nature to the scientific observer without, and the
shift from final causes to efficient causes.

Reflecting the

social and political attitudes prevalent during this time,
Galileo's use of physics ultimately took God out of the
primary scheme of the physical and scientific world.

The

study of final causes seemed devoid of practical utility;
the study of efficient causes enable one to control nature
and to extend man's dominion over nature
(Coppleston 1953, 21).
Galileo's focus on efficient cause rather than final
cause as the reason for motion and change may be seen in his
thoughts concerning astronomy.

Motion, for Galileo, was not

a result of God's desire and action to cause planets to move
constantly, rather, it was inertial movement in the bodies
themselves.

God, in Galileo's model, put everything into

motion once, and the rest is taken care of by the inertial
movement of matter itself.

Matter interacting with other

matter was the cause of motion within the physical realm.
Instead of focusing upon the reasoning of the "mover" for
motion, Galileo could concentrate on the observable,
measurable, mechanical, quantitative, and ultimately
predictable actions of celestial bodies in motion.
According to Oelschlaeger, the picture of the natural world,
accordingly, was radically changed for Galileo.

The theory

of inertia explained the motion of both the heaven and the

72

earth, and there was therefore only one true science —
physics —

and God played a very small role in it.

However, Galileo did not divorce final cause from the
entirety of the modern worldview, but merely from the
scientific understanding and treatment of the physical
world.

According to Oelschlaeger:

Nature as system of matter-in-motion was to be
understood through knowledge of efficient cause
and inertial motion, not final cause; but the
traditional Judeo-Christian view of nature as
an earthly abode designed by God in Heaven for
humankind was left intact (Oelschlaeger, 80).
Most of the great names in early modern science, according
to Glacken, did not deny design in nature nor the validity
of final causes.

The Copernican and Galilean theories had

not called God or his creative act into question;

the

cosmic system was a product of divine design and order.
Galileo's treatment of the natural world understood
from the perspective of efficient cause inspired the thought
of Isaac Newton.

With Newton the world was finally

comprehended under a unified, dynamic mechanical system.
Newton showed the laws of the universe to exemplify one
gigantic mathematical harmony moving to the music of the
dynamic principles established by terrestrial experiment,
and induction by Galileo and himself.

With Newton, the

world was not only thought of as a machine, but was
exhibited in detail as a function of mechanical law —
system of the world.

a

All matters of celestial and

terrestrial mechanics, found among Kepler, Copernicus, and
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Galileo, were unified into a grand system of mathematicalmechanical laws (Hurlbutt 1965, 5).
Newton's mechanical-geometrical conception of the
world order, however, provided him with the basis for his
theological inquiries.

The law of gravity, the law of

optics, the laws of organisms, all exhibit order and system
—

an exquisite design that inherently implies a designer.

According to Robert Hurlbutt:
with Newton the system of the world was held to
be so beautifully displayed, its cognitive
character so well determined, its mechanism so
clearly formulated in terms of mathematical
proportions
that
the
designer
could
be
specified as an intelligent geometer...In the
Godhead, therefore Newton locates by the final
cause, the ultimate purpose of the universe,
the forms of patterns, and the efficient cause
— the beginning of motion (Hurlbutt, 79).
This use of scientific notions in theology provided
theologians with a reinvigorated design and teleological
argument that dominated religious thought for a century or
more and provided the beginnings of the scientific
counterreaction to Modernism.

The Initial Scientific Counterreaction:

Phvsico-Theoloqists

The scientific counterreaction to Modernism was
grounded in an attempt to recast traditional philosophical
and religious beliefs in a manner consistent with the
onslaught of scientific knowledge.

Most seminal scientific

thinkers, however, retained some belief in final cause.
According to Glacken:
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It is true that
[Galileo's and Newton's]
scientific method could do without teleological
explanation;
the basic
forces
controlling
creation could be stated in mathematical terms,
and teleology could be put to one side, or
survive in the form of conventional piety.
It
is not so easy, however, to ignore its hold on
the
earth
and
life
sciences
from
the
seventeenth
to
the
nineteenth
centuries
(Glacken, 505).
Although efficient cause supplanted final cause within the
scientific paradigm, there was within the scientific
community a developing minority tradition that did not
wholly embrace the mechanistic worldview.

Such scientists

believed the factual evidence about the world and the .
creatures in it supported the idea of a divine plan.
The physico-theologist movement (also known as natural
theology)

led the early challenge to the mechanistic science

of Modernism.

"Many of these [thinkers]", as Glacken notes;

emphasized
the
significance
of
organic
interrelationships on the earth, and their
views are not unlike modern ideas of the
balance and order of nature.
There are,
however, two significant differences.
The
destructive interferences of human cultures on
the balance and harmony of nature did not enter
into their works,
and the harmonies,
the
adaptations of organisms to the environment and
to each other, were works performed by God at
the creation.
The emphasis was therefore on
form,
adaptation,
and arrangement,
not on
growth
and
development
as
in
modern
evolutionary theory (Glacken, 393).
John Ray's work, The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works
of the Creation, provides an example of the physicotheological position. It examines the nature of the earth
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and the natural harmonies observable on it, and attempts to
find a place for man and his labors in it as well.
Ray (1627-1705) argued that nature could not be
understood simply as inert matter-in-motion, believing that
the biological and geological evidence overwhelmingly
indicated that nature was more than a mere collection of its
parts.

Mechanistic materialism, therefore, had failed to

account for nature as actually observed (Oelschlaeger, 101).
In spite of the apparent success that physical science
claimed in explaining the motion of strictly material
objects, Ray argued that there was no conflict between faith
and reason when it came to the world of animate-matter-inmotion.

According to Glacken:

To Ray, a belief in the constancy of nature, in
the consistent fertility and fruitfulness of
the earth, is not only a logical inference from
the divine plan,
but is warranted by
the
evidences of contemporary observation; it is
obvious from the
use men make of natural
products about them...[we
may see in
the
natural
products]
the wisdom
of
God
in
supplying man with the means of lifting himself
out of savagery, for without them we could have
'nothing of Culture or civility'
(Glacken,
419) .
For Ray then, the world was far too complex and diverse to
be explained or understood through Newtonian mechanics.
Nature was incomprehensible without the notion of a supreme
creator and, accordingly, Ray attacked the CartesianNewtonian scientific program and developed a positive
account of nature as a living entity created by God
(Oelschlaeger, 101).
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Ray's discussion of nature as the result of a divine
plan or final cause was not an attempt to overthrow the new
scientific paradigm.

"At first," according to Worster, "Ray

attempted to salvage the mechanical philosophy from the
abuses of those who were using it to account for nature
without the intervention and assistance of any superior
immaterial agent"

(Worster, 42).

However, as a natural

historian, he did understand the vast amount of information
that seemed consistent with the machine metaphor.
Accordingly Ray struck a compromise:

he could not find

sufficient reason through efficient cause to explain the
harmonious interrelations among the diverse elements of the
natural world, for these testified to the existence of a
divine creator (Oelschlaeger, 102).

God, for Ray, did exist

and he, in turn, designed a world which worked on the
observable principles of mathematics and mechanics.
The significance of Ra y ’s work is that it represented
an impressive command of the knowledge of natural history in
an attempt to demonstrate that unity existed in nature and
that this unity was a result of a creative process started
and maintained by God (Glacken, 416).

Ray's work, however,

did not go beyond the anthropomorphic framework provided by
Judeo-Christianity.

Although the natural abundance of the

world was not designed specifically for man, Ray accepted
the biblical interpretation for its exploitation.
to Glacken:

According
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Ray considers the planet as a unit...This view
of man in his relation to the earth is a
gracious, almost idyllic, one:
a friendly
abode for man has been created by Ray's
beneficent Creator...and grateful man...uses
the beautiful earth...even though is was not
designed especially for him (Glacken, 421).
Ray advocated a kind of Christian stewardship of the earth,
but the events of the nineteenth century, the work of Darwin
and then Marsh, destroyed the notions of a designed earth
and with it, the ethic of Christian stewardship
(Oelschlaeger, 103).
Ray had planted the initial seed of ecology in his
fusion of natural history into a comprehensive theory of
unity.

From Ray's seminal work two major traditions in

ecology emerged in this early period.

According to Donald

Worster:
The first was an 'arcadian' stance toward
nature, epitomized by Gilbert White, the parson
naturalist of Selborne.
This arcadian view
advocated a simple, humble life for man with
the aim of restoring him to a peaceful
coexistence with other organisms.
The second,
an 'imperial' tradition, is best represented
in the work of Carl Linnaeus —
the key
ecological figure of the age —
and of the
Linnaeans generally.
Their ambition was to
establish, through the exercise of reason and
by hard work,
man's dominion over nature
(Worster, 2).
During the time, the scientific community was moving more
and more into the confines of Modernism —

abstract physical

and chemical theories that interpreted the natural world as
mere matter-in-motion and sought above all else knowledge of
efficient cause (Oelschlaeger, 104).
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Arcadian and Imperial Science
The Arcadians were a minority in the scientific
community, inspired by the work of Ray.

Arcadian scientists

did not seek the knowledge of efficient causes, but rather
an understanding of the whole of the natural world and how
each component related with other components.
epitomized by Gilbert White (1720-1793).

This work was

White, along with

Ray, had long observed nature and wielded an impressive
knowledge of natural history.

However, White had a

philosophic dimension beyond Ray and his physico-theological
leanings which ultimately interpreted the world with a
utilitarian palette.

This dimension in White's concept of

ecology was the arcadian harmony with nature as he found it
in his rural life.

White's appreciation of nature roust be

viewed in terms of his shared environment.

His was an

idyllic, pastoral setting that allowed for appreciation, as
opposed to the American pioneer experience that left no time
for appreciation.

"But, the overwhelming impression in

[White's] arcadian writing," notes Worster, "is of a man
eager to accept all nature into his parish sympathies"
(Worster, 10).

Ecology for White was thus a means not to

the Cartesian end of power over nature but rather to
recreate or rediscover and maintain a primal bond with the
natural world (Oelschlaeger, 104).
White's arcadian ecology, however, was not only
ignored for almost a half-century,

(England was too busy
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consolidating and adjusting to the processes of
modernization to read about the "crinking of field
crickets") but was rivalled in the eighteenth century by
imperial ecology, a tradition that sought to control nature
and made that one of humankind's most important ends
(Worster, 29).

The Swedish botanist Carl von Linne (1707-

1778, also know as Linnaeus, is recognized as the leading
figure in imperial ecology.

For Linnaeus, humans occupied a

special place of dignity and honor in nature.

He declaring

that "Everything may be made subservient to [human] use"
(Worster, 37).

Linnaeus was both Cartesian, in his attempt

to classify clearly and distinctly all the natural world,
and Baconian in his belief that the end of such knowledge
was the control of nature (Oelschlaeger, 105).
The control of nature by man, in a Linnaean framework,
used as its root metaphor the notion of nature as a machine.
Linnaeus' believed that a creator had designed an integrated
order in nature which functioned like a single, universal,
well-oiled machine.

Accordingly, all parts of nature took

on the aspects of machines.

Elements of nature were

interchangeable, expendable, and had in them only
instrumental, utilitarian value.

Most importantly, the

Linnaean, imperial view found it helpful to ignore any
aspect of nature that could not be made to fit into this
mechanical picture (Worster, 40).

God and humankind stood

above and outside of the rest of creation.
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Counterreactions to the science of Modernism,
beginning with the physico-theologists and continuing
through the arcadian tradition, never seriously challenged
the notion that nature might be for man's use.

"Both the

'mechanick philosophers1 and the physico-theologists,"
according to Glacken, "were united...in the goal of man's
attaining control over nature..." (Glacken, 426).

The

challenge from the physico-theologists leveled itself
against what they perceived as science's removal of God from
natural history.

The physical sciences' use of the

mechanistic and mathematical equations to divide the natural
world into measurable, quantifiable units seemed to be the
first steps in which the divine controlling hand would be
replaced by the fortuitous movement of brute matter
(Worster, 40).

These counterreactionaries were of the

opinion that it was not their duty to keep the world free of
its use scientific thought, but rather to place God back
into its equations and return humankind to harmony with
nature.

Darwin and Marsh
The publication of two works —

Charles Darwin's

Origin of Species in 1859 and George Marsh's Man and Nature
in 1863 —

shattered the foundations of the idea of a

divine, pre-established harmony between humankind and the
natural world that Ray, White, and Linnaeus presupposed.

It
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is in the works of Darwin and Marsh that the American
conservation movement found the basis for its scientific
support.

According to Oelschlaeger:

the tension between science and theology, and
the strain between the facts determined by
research and traditional beliefs established by
faith, soon rendered the argument from design
untenable...divine providence was on the verge
of becoming otiose within the framework of
efficient causation (Oelschlaeger, 106).
Although he had grown up within a traditional JudeoChristian education, and was heavily influenced by the work
of the natural theologist William Paley, Darwin could not
rectify the design argument with his research:

the facts of

nature could be basically explained by natural selection.
God, in turn, was evicted from the world of science.
Darwin's revolutionary thought, although falling
within the purview of the scientific revolution, challenged
the dominating scientific paradigm of the time.

The science

and physics of Modernism defended by Galileo, Descartes, and
Newton did nothing to challenge the overall hegemony of the
theology of their time.

Science, they argued, was. a more

perfect account of God's glory since he was the architect of
the natural world and mathematics was a more accurate
narration of God's creation (Oelschlaeger, 106).

The

implications of Darwin's thought regarding God's place in
nature were much more profound.
The bedrock of the idea upon which Darwin built was
that the overall survival of life upon the earth was
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socially determined (Worster, 156).

Nature, Darwin

observed, was a "web of complex relations" and no individual
organism or species can live independently of that web.
Here Darwin shows the influence of the physico-theologist's
view that nature was not a mere sum of its parts but a
complex of intricate living interrelationships. According to
Worster:
A parallel assumption was that even the most
insignificant creatures [were] important to the
welfare of their conjoining species; somewhere
at least they are
'essential members
of
society, or at some former period may have been
s o ’ (Worster, 156).
Much of Darwin's interest focused upon the relatedness of
species with their surrounding environment.

Darwin

concluded from this evidence that nature was indeed one
grand scheme of cooperative integration.
Another important element in Darwin's thought was his
realization that no one species can hold a particular place
in nature forever.

According to Darwin:

All organic beings are striving to seize on
each place in the economy of nature...All we
can do, is to keep steadily in mind that each
organic being is striving to increase in a
geometric ratio; that each at some period of
its life, during some season of the year,
during each generation or at intervals, has to
struggle
for
life
and
to
suffer
great
destruction (Darwin 1896, 94).
That nature could be imperfect and self-corrective through
competitive improvement in any one of its many parts was a
radical departure from the thought and belief system of the
time.
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11It cannot be denied" according to Michael Ruse, "that
generally the Origin sparked an explosion" with ideas such
as a "web" of complex interrelations and nature as being a
self-corrective, imperfect system" (Ruse 1979, 203) .
However, the most important result of Darwin's thought,
aside from his ideas on the interconnectedness of nature,
was evolution's impact upon the perception of man's place in
nature.

For those who were relatively unfettered by

orthodox religious beliefs, according to Ruse:
the question of man was fairly easy to answer.
Forget religion and let the 'facts' speak for
themselves.
For someone on the other side of
the barrier for whom religion was paramount and
the Bible was the authority, the question was
again fairly easy to answer.
God had created
man miraculously in his own image. The person
desperately in trouble by the question was the
man in the middle — the one who wanted to roll
with the advances of science and who saw great
virtues in evolutionism...but who was also keen
to see man set apart, the favored of God (Ruse,
245) .
However, for Darwin there was to be no compromise:

humans,

no less than any other organism, must be explained in purely
natural terms (Ruse, 248).
Darwin's evolutionary science ran against the idea of
humans being created by special circumstance, for the
evidence showed that humankind was inextricably related and
involved in an environment that was a world of biological
and geological variations exhibiting no tendency to a final
configuration.

According to Darwin:

The main conclusion here arrived at, and now
held by many naturalists who are well competent
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to form a sound judgment is that man is
descended from some less highly organized
form...[the] facts cannot be disputed.
They
have long been known, but until recently they
told us nothing with respect to the origin of
man.
Now when viewed by the light of our
knowledge of the whole organic world, their
meaning is unmistakable.
The great principle
of evolution stands up clear and firm...He who
is not content to look like a savage, at the
phenomena of nature as disconnected, cannot any
longer believe that man is the work of a
separate act of creation...[the facts] all
point in the plainest manner to the conclusion
that man is the co-descendant with other
mammals of a common progenitor
(Darwin 1906, 620).
The human species was not seen as divinely ordained to
inherit the earth.

Moreover, humankind was more deeply

involved in the "web of life” than the physico-theologists
and arcadian ecologist suspected.
One of the primary lessons that Darwin noted from his
thought regarding evolution was that humans had not been
created with special care in the image of God; therefore
humans were to be considered one with all other species in a
universal relationship with living things.

According to

Worster:
In the final analysis, the figure of Darwin
must remain the most imposing and persuasive
force
behind
the
biocentric
movement.
Conservationist or not...he shared...a quality
of feeling of nature that finally may be as
important as any of his theories.
It survived
the shock of the Galapagos, the pessimism of
Malthus, and the melancholy of reality of
competitive selection...While he might agree
that the natural world is not an altogether
pleasant or happy place, he could not for that
reason believe that man should repudiate it or
feel himself superior to it. He never faltered
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in his belief that beyond humanity and its
affairs lies a living ecological community that
has always been man's ultimate home and kin
(Worster, 187).
Darwin made it clear that humankind was not above and
outside of the world in which they resided, a position that
would be expressed in the second important critique of
Modernism.
The second scientific critique came in the form of
George Marsh's volume, Man and Nature (also known by its
second edition as The Earth as Modified bv Human Action).
Having traveled broadly while in the Foreign Service under
the Lincoln administration, Marsh was able to collect a vast
amount of knowledge and evidence regarding human impact upon
its environs.

Considered to be the first modern volume on

ecology, Man and Nature's impact can still be witnessed
today insofar as the book remains to be in print.

Humans,

according to Marsh, on the whole, were a destabilizing agent
in nature and these activities pointed to an uncertain
future.

"The object of the present volume is," according to

Marsh:
to indicate the character and, approximately,
the extent of the changes produced by human
action in the physical conditions of the globe
we inhabit;
to point out the dangers of
imprudence and the necessity of caution in all
operations which, on a large scale, interfere
with
the
spontaneous
arrangements
of the
organic or the inorganic world; to suggest the
possibility
and
the
importance
of
the
restoration of the disturbed harmonies and the
material improvement of waste and exhausted
regions; and, incidently, to illustrate the
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doctrine that man is, in
a power of a higher order
forms of animated life,
nourished at the table
(Marsh 1907, vii).

both kind and degree,
than any of the other
which, like him, are
of bounteous nature

Although writing clearly from what is an
anthropocentric view of nature, Marsh's experience differed
from that of previous naturalists.

According to David

Lowenthal:
Jefferson, Franklin, Benjamin Rush, and their
contemporaries were absorbed by man's impact
upon
the
environment,
but
regarded
the
transformation of nature as beneficent and
desirable.
The Jeffersonians thought almost
every change an improvement...cultivating the
wilderness transformed the countryside from
primitive chaos to order and civilized beauty.
The characteristic attitude toward man and
nature was well expressed by Vermonter Ira
Allen; he praised the settler who 'sees the
effect of his own powers, aided by the goodness
of Providence1 (Lowenthal 1958, 250).
Most Americans before Marsh believed in the plenitude of
nature, the inexhaustibility of natural resources, and the
power of the rational mind to control and enhance wilderness
for man's benefit.

Although Marsh acknowledged man's power

to have a profound impact upon his environment, he assessed
the results more realistically than did his predecessors
(Lowenthal, 251).
Marsh's thoughts regarding man and nature are
straightforward.

Beginning with a physical description of

the Roman Empire, Marsh described the surrounding land of
the Mediterranean stripped of all its natural defenses
against the destructive forces both nature and humankind
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have to provide.
postulated,

Once humankind has conquered nature, Marsh

it cannot relax its care of it. "This lesson,"

writes Lowenthal, "led Marsh to consider the quality and
extent of human influence" upon its surroundings
(Lowenthal, 257).

In their natural state, geographical and

environmental components generally exhibit change slowly.
However, according to Lowenthal:
man, especially civilized man, 'guided by a
self conscious and intelligent will aiming as
often at secondary and remote as immediate
objects,1 transforms the environment rapidly.
The evidence convinced Marsh that human impact
—
by contrast with that of animals —
was
unique in scope and intensity
(Lowenthal, 257).
No natural forces, Marsh concludes, balance human influence
over the material and natural world.

The only limit to

humankind's impact upon nature and wilderness was its own
self-restraint.
As with so many early "ecological" thinkers, Marsh met
nature and its wilderness with a divided mind and his
opinions about it were qualified by his religious and
philosophical leanings.

Although he conceived of nature as

being in unity, Marsh molded his Calvinism and Romanticism
into a paean of humankind's place in nature.

However, Marsh

abhorred the mechanistic rationalism of the modern age.

His

view of a proper balance between humans and nature was
modeled on Ray's notion of Christian stewardship.

Marsh did

not question humankind's superiority over nature, but he
rebuked the senseless waste he observed being generated by
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the modern market economy.

The conclusion of his volume

appears remarkably modern in the depth of its ecological
insight:
It is a legal maxim that 'the law concerneth
itself
not
with
trifles'...but
in
the
vocabulary of nature, little and great are
terms of comparison only; she knows no trifles,
and her laws are as inflexible in dealing with
an atom as with a continent or a planet. . .human
operations... therefore, do act in the ways
ascribed to them, though our limited faculties
are at present, perhaps forever, incapable of
weighing their immediate, still more their
ultimate, consequences.
But our inability to
assign definite values to these causes of the
disturbance of natural arrangements is not a
reason for ignoring the existence of such
causes in any general view of the relations
between man and nature, and we are never
justified
in
assuming
a
force
to
be
insignificant because its measure is unknown,
or because no physical effect can now be traced
to it as its origin (Marsh, 617).
It was not for nature's sake that Marsh wanted to protect it
against humans, but rather for humankind's sake.
Marsh was neutral —

Nature.for

humans were the conscious and moral

agent (Lowenthal, 34 0).
The result of Darwin's and Marsh's thought proved to
be a wrecking operation on the Baconian-Cartesian scientific
paradigm of Modernism that sought to reduce nature to inert,
dead, quantitative matter, devoid of any intrinsic value for
its subsequent exploitation in a world market economy. The
cumulative effect of the inherent contradictions between
faith and reason, and the ongoing course of the scientific
and industrial revolutions, helped engendered the downfall

89

of an entire ideology (Oelschlaeger, 109).

According to

Worster:
By the 1850's the synthesis of piety and
science represented by Linnaeus, Ray, and White
had been reduced to a cracked and dried- out
shell; little of its vitality remained...as
much as [Thoreau] delighted to linger with the
older generation of naturalists, he discovered
that he had to 'come down' a good distance;
their
carefully
constructed
world
of
intermeshed science and religious values was no
longer tenable (Worster, 63).
The position of humankind over nature had been dealt a
serious blow by Darwin.

The power of Darwin's thought can

be understood in terms of the context and paradigm against
which he railed.

Darwin had undone in a single volume what

had been developing in Western thought for nearly two
millennia.
The physico-theologists' idea of humankind and nature
as God's creations helped provide the initial scientific
counterreaction to the Baconian-Cartesian science of
Modernism.

Although their theoretical framework ultimately

failed, with the breakdown of the doctrines of special
creation and preestablished harmony, and the collapse of the
argument for design and final cause, their movement, in
terms of conservation at least, had a positive impact.
road of the physico-theologists", according to Glacken:
was more winding [than Modernism's science] and
there were blind alleys...Much later...when it
became apparent that man's stewardship of
nature was no longer an accurate description of
his role, there was disillusionment, and with
it the realization that man could relentlessly
destroy nature in ways that they did not even

"The
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suspect themselves capable of, that many of
their efforts were not divinely guided...[and]
that they could not be dignified by identifying
them with the Creator's purpose.
The real
contribution of physico-theology...was that it
saw
living
interrelationships
in
nature
concretely.
It documented them.
It had
already —
before Darwin's 'web of life' —
prepared men for the study of ecology
(Glacken, 427).
Considering the unity of nature and nature as non-mechanic,
physico-theology and arcadian ecology led to the
revolutionary thought of Darwin and Marsh and ultimately
helped to shape recent perceptions of humans and their
relationship with their environment.

Although contemporary

ecology is devoid of theological considerations, the
underlying notion that every element in an ecosystem has a
role to play is historically grounded in the natural
theology of the physico-theologists and arcadians
(Oelschlaeger, 109).
The reaction to Modernism's philosophy and worldview
occurred through a variety of different forms of thought.
As described in this and the preceding chapters, the
counterreaction occurred at the literary, philosophical, and
scientific levels.

These literary and philosophical

counterreaction traditions came to form the core of the
preservationist movement.

The scientific counterreaction

for the most part, however, was used to support
conservationist arguments, although the scientific
counterreaction would eventually manifest itself much later
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in the preservation movement with the advent of the science
of ecology.

As will be seen in the following chapter,

Marsh's work was used to argue for wise management of
natural resources, not their preservation.

As such, the

conservation movement used the scientific counterreaction
in manner which would defend, not challenge, the modern
notions of growth and productivity and nature as a material
resource.

CHAPTER 6

PRESERVATION AND CONSERVATION:

THE PARADIGMATIC TENSION

Introduction
As noted in the previous chapters, there were several
levels of counterreaction to the dominant paradigm of
Modernism.

Each of these, in turn, came to have an impact

upon the politics of American wilderness.

The philosophical

and literary counterreactions were articulated in the
preservationist arguments for wilderness.

The scientific

counterreaction was articulated in conservationist arguments
that sought only to manage and regulate, not challenge, the
growth and progress advocated by Modernism.

This chapter,

then, explores the tension between the two competing
paradigms represented by the preservationist and
conservationist attitudes towards wilderness.

Preservation and Conservation
Although their ultimate ends were both
anthropocentric, conservation and preservation differed in
terms of their paradigmatic implications.

Preservationists

represented an shift away from Modernism, appealing to the
aesthetic, spiritual, and cultural properties of wilderness
92
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for the development of the individual, and stood firm in its
challenge to the unrestrained growth inherent in Modernism.
Moreover preservationists argued for a conceptual framework
that no longer held humans outside and above of nature.
Preservationists became increasingly willing to sacrifice
the gains of civilization and Modernism's technology and
progress for the benefits that they saw offered to the
individual and society by pristine stands of untrammeled
wilderness.
Conservationists on the other hand saw conservation of
natural resources as necessary for materialistic and
economic purposes.

Conservation did not, therefore,

challenge the dominant social paradigm outright, although it
did find it necessary to take into account the scientific
observations advanced by Darwin and Marsh, e.g., humankind's
place in nature and watershed protection.

The conservation

movement is best illustrated by figures such as Gifford
Pinchot who believed that forests could provide a
sustainable yield of timber while providing for multiple use
as well.

According to Pinchot:

The earth and its resources belong of right to
its people.
Without resources life itself is
impossible.
From birth to death, natural
resources, transformed for human use, feed,
clothe, shelter, and transport us . ..Without
abundant resources prosperity is out of reach.
Therefore the conservation of natural resources
is the fundamental material problem. It is the
open
door
to
economic
and
political
progress...The first duty of the human race on
the material side is to control the use of the
earth and all that therein is. Conservation
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means the wise use of the earth and
resources for the lasting good of men
(Pinchot 1987, 505).

its

According to Worster, this conservationism was a set of
ideals wholly compatible with industrialism.

The challenge

for the conservationists was to manage and regulate

forests

in the most efficient and economically feasible manner
possible, not to preserve wilderness.

Early Arguments for Preservation
It was during the middle of the nineteenth century
that preservation became the major vehicle for a national
discussion of wilderness.

Seminal appreciation for

wilderness in America at this time, built upon Thoreau's
notion that wildness and refinement were not fatal extremes
but equally beneficent influences, led to the sadness at its
disappearance from the American scene (Nash, 96).

Romantic

and nationalists' interest for wilderness grew during this
time? however, few thought of being able to challenge
successfully the ideas of progress and the claims made by
civilization endorsed by Modernism.

Preservation of

wilderness was almost incomprehensible in the social,
political, and economic climate of the time.
There were, however, Romantic arguments being made for
the preservation of wilderness.

Like other early supporters

of wilderness such as John Audubon and George Catlin,
Thoreau was disturbed at the disappearance of American

wilderness.

The less there was of it, the greater the

chance for an unhealthy and spiritually weakened society.
Nash notes that in 1854, while he was faced with the
prospect of a totally civilized America.

Thoreau concluded:

The kings of England formerly had their forests
'to hold the king's game,' for sport or food,
sometimes destroying villages to create or
extend them;
and I think that they were
impelled by a true instinct.
Why should not
we, who have renounced the king's authority,
have our national preserves, where no village
need be destroyed, in which the bear and
panther, and some even of the hunter race, may
still exist...— our forests, not to hold the
king's game merely, but to hold and preserve
the king himself also, the lord of creation, —
not for idle sport or food, but for inspiration
and our own re-creation (Thoreau 1985, 712).
Thoreau recognized in this claim that wilderness was needed
not only for the health of the individual, but for the
nation as well.
Thoreau made his claim again for preservation of wild
spaces while living in a number of small Massachusetts
townships in 1859.

Thoreau concluded that each of them

should have a park or primitive forest of five hundred to a
thousand acres, and that the public should hold these areas
as preserved from any commercial interests.

Several decades

of wilderness appreciation, developed through an American
sense of "wilderness" nationalism, can be seen as
culminating in Thoreau's defense of this proposal:

"let us

keep the New World new, preserve all the advantages of
living in [this] country" (Thoreau 1906, 387),

Thoreau of

course qualified his argument by indicating that only a few
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areas be kept completely wild, while the rest would be
preserved as pastoral enclaves.

However, in preserving the

benefits of wilderness, Thoreau saw the preservation of
civilization.
Where Thoreau had taken up the Romantic cause for
preservation, George P. Marsh argued the case of
conservation for more economic reasons:

the earth's ability

to sustain humankind's consumptive predilections.

Clear-

cutting of forests near watersheds, Marsh concluded,
resulted in environmental calamities such as droughts,
floods, and soil erosion.

Such disaster could lead, as in

the case of the Roman empire, to the downfall of entire
civilizations.

In Marsh's opinion the most efficient way to

maintain waterflow and supply was to maintain a healthy
forest around its watershed.

Under the auspices of Marsh's

insight, conservation gained an economic justification and
subsequently was made compatible with progress and economic
welfare as well (Nash, 105).

The Adirondack Preserve
Although Yellowstone National Park represents the
first instance of large-scale wilderness preservation in the
public's interest, the first instance of wilderness
preservation can be seen in New York's forest preserve in
the Adirondacks in 1885.

As Nash points out:

With [this] milestone in the early history of
American wilderness preservation, the ideas of
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Catlin, Thoreau,... and Marsh bore fruit.
Yet
in...[this] case the rationale for action [did
not] take account of the aesthetic, spiritual,
or
cultural
value
which
had
previously
stimulated appreciation.
In New York the
decisive argument concerned the necessity of
forested land for an adequate water supply
(Nash, 108).
The Preserve Act was initially the result of the scientific
counterreaction to Modernism as seen in Marsh's arguments
for watershed protection, not preservationist arguments.
The science employed in defense of this act was used for
economic and commercial gain, and failed to represent a
revolutionary shift away from Modernism.

The Preserve Act

never challenged the idea of progress directly.

Wilderness

was preserved unintentionally.
The initial "non-commercial" appreciation of the
Adirondacks was held by individuals who appreciated the more
cerebral and spiritual delights that the Adirondacks
offered.

Much of the area had been left undeveloped as the

nation's population headed.

As the population of New York

city burgeoned, and more and more people became engaged in
the urban experience, urban dwellers began looking to the
peace and serenity offered by the large stands of
undeveloped forest land that were the Adirondacks.

To the

middle-class urbanite this area represented an "enchanted
island" where city life, often tedious and complex, could be
left behind for the simple and untamed splendor of this area
(Nash, 116).
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While appreciation for the area grew, so too did the
attention being made of the loss of its wilderness
qualities.

Initially the idea was to prevent industrial

development from occurring in areas designated as preserves.
These same industrial pressures however would find relief in
those other areas not marked for preservation.

Thus a

balance was struck between the pressures upon the region for
enjoyment and utility.
This idea of a balance having been struck is
important.

In suggesting that the areas not preserved be

open to development, the supporters of a wilderness preserve
did not place themselves in opposition directly to the
forces of Modernism —

progress and industry.

Rather they

argued that the reserve, in preserving timber and
maintaining the watershed, would guarantee an adequate and
constant supply of drinking water for the city of New York,
as well as helping to maintain the state's canal system,
which provided for a cheap form of transportation.
Wilderness preservation and commercial prosperity were
synthesized.

However much the Romantics desired

preservation for non-utilitarian purposes, they realized
that they could not defend their position without accepting
the argument for watershed protection based on Marsh's
observations (Nash, 118).
By the 1880's, declining water levels began to appear
in the Erie and Hudson water systems causing the argument
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for preservation of the upland forest to intensify. Where
resident's of New York had been indifferent to previous
arguments, they now became enraged by lumber and mining
practices alleged to be taking place in the Adirondacks.
According to Nash:
It was predicted that without protection of the
woodlands municipal water supplies could run
dry and periodic droughts [would] render the
state waterway useless.
At other times
disastrous floods might inundate the lowlands.
Obviously the effect upon commerce would be
catastrophic...merchants
believed
that
if
drought eliminated the Erie-Hudson route as a
means of shipping goods, railroads would have a
monopoly and be able to raise rates at will.
It would not require a love of wilderness to
come to the defense of the Adirondacks on these
grounds (Nash, 119).
Put to the business community in these terms, the New York
Chamber of Commerce, under the leadership of Morris K.
Jessup, joined the fight for preservation.

In May of 1885

the Governor of New York, David Hill, approved a bill
establishing 715,000 acres as preserve that were to remain
undeveloped in an effort to maintain the Hudson and Erie
waterways and New York with a constant supply of water
(Schaefer 1989, xxi).
In terms of a shift away from Modernism, the
Adirondack preserve offered limited success.

Initial

Romantic aims may have flown in the face of the dominant
social paradigm of the time, but its advocates were all too
aware of the social, political, and economic atmosphere of
the time as determined by the paradigm of Modernism.

The
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Romantics deemed their position untenable without the
support of the economic, commercial interests.

This is not

to say, however, that the Romantic position had failed to
make an impact.
Although conservation arguments carried the day for
the initial preserve act in 188 5, New York legislators in
1892 redesignated the reserve as a state park partially for
the reason to offer overworked urban folk a chance to get
away from the pressures of life in Gotham.

The wording of

the act is indicative of the Romantic's impact and a
subsequent shift of position:

Adirondack State Park was to

be "ground open for the free use of all the people for their
health and pleasure, and as forest land necessary for the
preservation of the headwaters of the chief rivers of the
state, and as a future supply of timber"
(New York Laws, quoted by Nash, 120).

Moreover, during New

York's constitutional convention of 1894, proponents
favoring the

assurance of the preserve's protection (mainly

commercial interests from New York) asked that guarantees be
written into the constitution itself.
commercial

Although the

(conservationist) argument was used, David

McClure, the attorney hired to defend the preserve, declared
that the first reason for the preserves purpose was that it
was a place for New York's citizen's to rest and recuperate
in the quiet and solitude offered only in wilderness.
people of New York, as represented by members of the

The

101

Constitutional Convention,

invested control of the

Adirondacks to the people of the state and secured the area
as "forever kept as wild forest lands" (Schaefer, xxi).
According to Nash, the watershed argument had been the
mainstay earlier in the defense of wilderness, but by the
1890's those seeking to justify the preserving of
wilderness began to turn more and more to preservationist
arguments.

The Romantic concern for aesthetics and culture

had achieved, under the aegis of the New York State
Constitution, the same legal recognition as conservationist
arguments at the state level.

The rationale for wilderness

preservation was slowly coming together with the ideology of
appreciation (Nash, 121)

These Romantic, preservationist

arguments were, in turn, even more forceful in the creation
of the nation's National Park Service.

The National Park Service
To understand better the creation of the National Park
Service,

it is necessary first to discuss a key element

contributing to its creation —

the national parks. The

creation of National Parks, like the New York state Forest
Preserve Act, did not initially set wilderness aside for the
sake of wilderness.

Yellowstone was created in an attempt

to protect its natural "curiosities" and "wonders" from
private exploitation.

"In this manner," according to Nash,

"the right of the public to see these sights would be
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safeguarded and the scenery itself saved from defacement"
(Nash, 110).

When first declared a national park, the area

of Yellowstone Park included more that 3,300 square miles.
The reason for such a vast area, it was argued, was to
protect undiscovered wonders in the area —

wilderness did

not figure into the initial plans for park preserves
(Runte 1979, 34).
Much of the argument in the preservation of scenic
wonders in the American landscape came as a result of the
translation of the Romantic aesthetic appreciation of
wilderness into a notion of national pride.

Such natural

wonders such as the Yosemite Valley in California, or the
geysers in Yellowstone, were seen to help make up for what
America lacked culturally.

Preservation of wilderness

areas, especially those with spectacular scenic displays,
became the preservation of American heritage.

Where Europe

could boast the Louvre and the Coliseum, the United States
could boast unique, monumental, natural features such as
those found in its national parks.

"To ignore the

threatened confiscation of Yellowstone's wonders by private
interests," writes Runte, "would [have been perceived as
saying] that the United States had no pride in its culture"
(Runte, 44).
The desire to preserve wilderness was not without
scientific interest.

Beside attempts at protecting scenic

wonders, there were attempts at preserving unique scientific
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phenomenon found in America's wilderness which culminated in
the Antiquities Act of 1906.

Introduced by Iowa congressman

John Lacey, himself a staunch preservationist, the bill
sought to preserve all objects of historic or cultural
interest that are situated upon the lands owned or
controlled by the Government of the United States
(Runte, 71).

Although the focus of the bill was not the

scenic splendor found in national parks, Lacey's intent used
the same rationale for the national parks:

protection of

America's cultural heritage.
Although preservation was gathering strength in the
early twentieth century as reflected in the growing number
of national parks and monuments at the time, the movement
suffered a major set back with the loss of Hetch Hetchy
Valley in the Yosemite National Park in December of 1913 to
hydroelectric development for San Francisco.

It was at this

time, that a majority of the preservationists agreed that
the national parks could not be defended by the traditional
Romantic arguments of national pride, culture, or scenery
alone.

"As a result," according to Runte:

...pirating
the
slogans
of
utilitarian
conservation, preservationists followed Muir in
defending the national parks as a means of
preventing 'waste' in their own right.
As
distinct from proper management of the national
forests, the stakes were merely in terms of
human 'efficiency'.
But if 'we must consider
[the national
parks]
from the commercial
standpoint,1 Allen Chamberlin, a New England
advocate said, 'let it not be forgotten that
Switzerland regards its scenery as a moneyproducing asset to the extent of some two
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hundred millon dollars annually.' When further
tied to scenic nationalism, nothing did more
for the preservationist cause. As far back as
the creation of Yellowstone National Park in
1872, the railroads of the West promoted scenic
protection...in the appreciation
that
the
attraction of more tourists into the region
meant greater revenues. Increasingly cognizant
of
the
significance
of
this
fact,
preservationist turned to the railroads for
political
and
financial
aid
during
[preservation] campaigns. The rewards of this
'pragmatic alliance1 were soon confirmed by the
growing public support for a bureau of national
parks,
an agency
fully committed to the
principles
of
[aesthetic]
as
opposed
to
utilitarian conservation (Runte, 83).
Such was the situation at the time of the founding of the
National Park service.
The passage of the National Park Service legislation
in 1916 represents the last major success of what is known
in American history as the Progressive Movement.

The

failure of preservationists to protect Hetch Hetchy from
development, and the need to communicate their philosophy,
caused members of the movement to reevaluate the traditions
and reasoning behind their movement (Runte, 84).

Scenic

preservation was clearly an established value in the
movement and it was made clear that at its roots the
preservationists remained firmly committed to its Romantic
heritage.
The call for national parks and a government service
to run them was supported by a wide variety of groups and
individuals such as the Sierra Club, the Boone and Crockett
Club, various garden, women's, and horticultural clubs.

To
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these were added recently urbanized country dwellers whose
memories of rural hardships were quickly ended by the
"confinement of city streets"

(Runte, 85).

What developed

in the cities and urban fringes was a continuation of the
romanticized version of wilderness in America.

"Even at the

price of one or two hours of commuting, many thought the
opportunity to escape from the grime...and overcrowding of
city life was a welcome relief" (Runte, 85).

It was among

these urban dwellers that the large majority of national
park supporters were to be found.
Although much of the support for the parks remained
aesthetic, in the long run the dominant social and political
atmosphere made it necessary to associate scenic protection
with more utilitarian economic growth in an effort to defend
the idea of a national park system.

As with the

preservation of the Adirondacks in New York, aesthetics
alone could not defend the preservationist movement.

It

followed that as preservationists played their hand before
Congress, the monetary appeal of scenic protection remained
a trump (Runte, 100).

Instead of the standard

preservationist cry for scenery and aesthetics, arguments
for the National Park Service ranged from the need to keep
tourism within the United States, to the need for providing
areas of rest and relaxation for working persons in an
attempt to maintain high levels of worker productivity.
the purpose of passing the park service bill, first

For
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introduced in 1911, parks were linked to the idea of
utilitarian conservation rather than outright aesthetic
preservation.
As Runte notes, the idea of linkage to conservation
seemed incongruous with traditional preservationist values,
but it was accurate reflection of the quiet desperation the
preservationists felt with the loss of Hetch Hetchy.
Further, preservationists took comfort from the support of
the railroads, whose promotion of the national parks
confirmed that the park idea was in fact coming into its
own.

The efforts of Senator Reed Smoot of Utah to win

passage of the Park Service bill added to the growing
prestige of aesthetic conservation (Runte, 101).
What was achieved under the passage of the bill in 1916 was
the association of scenic preservation in the national parks
with the country's economic health.
Preservationists arguing for the establishment of the
National Park Service again could not in the social,
political, and economic climate of the time succeed without
invoking commercial and economic language of the
conservationists.

The Romantic roots can be clearly seen,

however, at the heart of the National Parks Service Act.
The fundamental purpose of the National Park Service was to:
conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wild life therein and
to provide for the enjoyment of the same in
such manner and by such means as will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
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generations (U.S. Department of the Interior,
quoted by Runte, 104).
The aesthetic preservationists had succeeded in gaining an
agency whose purview reflected their own and which helped to
counter their losses at Hetch Hetchy.
The paradigmatic implications of the establishment of
the National Park Service must be considered in terms of its
Romantic roots.

Although the preservationist dressed their

efforts in the language of economic utility in an effort to
garner support for their bill, its central purpose, the
preservation of America's natural scenery, always remained.
Where New York's Adirondack Preserve Act initially reflected
commercial leanings and did little to challenge the dominant
social paradigm, the National Parks Service Act was from its
inception influenced by preservationist forces and employed
conservationist language only in an effort to secure its
more Romantic aims.

Defense of Dinosaur National Monument
Half a century after the passing of the National Park
Service Act, the aesthetic sensibilities, wilderness
rationale, and the political skill of the preservationists
were tested again in a nationwide debate over the future of
a part of the United State National Park System.

The

dispute arose over a proposed dam on the Green River at Echo
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Park which threatened to flood Dinosaur National Monument on
the Colorado-Utah border.
In 1915 President Woodrow Wilson designated eighty
acres in Utah, under the authority of the Antiquities Act of
1906, for the purpose of protecting a deposit of dinosaur
skeletons imbedded in a shale and sandstone ledge.

The area

was enlarged under the Roosevelt administration to include
nearly one hundred miles of the deep river canyons of the
Yampa and Green Rivers with their surrounding benchlands.
However, the area had attracted not only paleontologists and
wilderness enthusiasts but the hydro-electric engineers' of
the multi-state Colorado River Storage Project.

The

project, sponsored by the Bureau of Reclamation, envisioned
a ten-dam system that would provide agricultural interests
in Nevada, Arizona, and California with adequate supplies of
water and electricity.

One of these dams, Echo Park,

located on the Green River, threatened to flood the Monument
with its resulting reservoir.

Upon learning of the project,

friends of the wilderness and the National Park protested.
With the support of the water-conscious Southwest,
reclamationists defended their proposal.

The controversy

quickly assumed major proportions, dominating conservation
politics in the 1950's (Nash, 210).
As in the previous cases, it is necessary to
understand the socio-political climate in which this case
was operating.

Post-war America was demanding a greater
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amount of power than ever before to fuel its burgeoning
consumer society.

Areas of the Southwest were becoming more

and more dependent upon water from diverted sources to
maintain their tenuous foothold in the marginal environment
of the West.

Even the Adirondacks, an area designated to be

free of development forever, came under heavy pressure from
hydro-electric interests.

The preservationists were again

under pressure to defend their notions of the aesthetic
value of wilderness from commercial interests.
In the case of the defense of Dinosaur National
Monument, as with the other events previously discussed, not
only was it necessary for preservationist forces to have the
proper funding and publicity, but it was essential for them
to have a convincing argument.

The preservationists brought

to bear the product of a century of thought regarding the
meaning and value of wilderness and remained with their
traditional Romantic roots.

According to Nash:

Some arguments rested on the need of civilized
man
for wilderness
sanctuaries which
had
precedents in the ideas of [Emerson], Thoreau,
and Muir...In 1950 Ulysses S. Grant III,
grandson of the President and himself the
president of the American Planning and Civic
Association, defended Dinosaur because 'our
industrial civilization is creating an even
greater
need
for
the
average
man...to
reestablish contact with nature...and to be
diverted away from the whirling wheels of
machinery
and
chance.'
George
Kelley,
representing
the
Colorado
Forestry
and
Horticultural Association...point[ed] out that
'wilderness areas have become to us a spiritual
necessity, an antidote to the strains of modern
living...[and allow people] to renew their
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souls and gain
(Nash, 213) .

fresh

perspective

on

life*

However, as the Congressional hearings on the Echo
Park project continued in 1955, it was clear that the
preservationists approached the problem with an additional
resource.

Rather than backing their traditional arguments

with commercial arguments, as had been done in the two prior
cases, the director of the Sierra Club at the time, David
Brower, turned the scientific data offered by the government
and its bureaus against them (Nash, 217).
The first tactic stemmed from the traditional Romantic
arguments of aesthetic and spiritual values of wilderness in
a materially driven, consumer society such as that found in
mid-twentieth century America.

Preservationists questioned

whether the pioneer domination of wilderness was an
appropriate attitude for the twentieth century.

Writer

Sigurd Olson, while addressing the Senate sub-committee,
pointed out that the frontiersman:
'did the job that needed to be done' but
wondered if 'in our mad rush to dam every
river,
chop down every tree, utilize all
resources to the ultimate limit...we might not
destroy the very things that have made life in
America
worth
cherishing
and
defending?1
(Olson, quoted by Nash, 217).
The flooding of Dinosaur National Monument, Olson concluded,
threatened the very philosophical core of wilderness
appreciation and the intangible qualities that had evolved
through history to help shape the American character.

Ill

While Olson and other wilderness advocates sounded the
Romantic battle cry once more, Brower challenged the Bureau
of Reclamation and the government with its own tools:
science, math, and statistics.

Much of the Bureau's

argument for the project was based on its calculations
regarding the amount of water lost to evaporation.

Their

claims asserted that the reservoir that would flood Dinosaur
National Monument was necessary to help maintain the water
supply as mandated in the Colorado River Compact of 1922.
Brower's testimony to the Senate's subcommittee claimed
exactly the opposite.

According to Nash:

Brower's testimony presented the mathematics
supporting his contention that the Bureau of
Reclamation had erred in its calculation of the
water that would be lost by evaporation from an
Echo Park reservoir.
Using the Bureau's own
base figures, he showed that the lake would
actually be far more costly in terms of water
loss than advertised and that the alternative
dam sites,
outside wilderness areas, were
preferable in this respect (Nash, 217).
Brower's contentions regarding the accuracy of the Bureau's
statistics not only called into question the economics of
the Echo Park reservoir but brought into question the entire
Colorado River Storage Project.
The preservationists had found their mark.

Although

the project had passed the Senate with approval, the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs endorsed a version
of the plan without the Echo Park Dam.

The language of the

bill, late in 1955, even included a statement that Congress
would not allow any dam or reservoir to be built under the
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authorization of the act within any National Park or
Monument.

The bill setting the Colorado River Storage

Project became law on April 11, 1956.

The wilderness

movement and preservationists, as Nash describes, had their
finest hour.

Basic to the preservationists' success,

according to Nash, was the development of a convincing
justification for the existence of wild country along with
an increase in the number of Americans who subscribed to it.
The justification, however, had to operate within a
Modernist framework in that it had to address economic
concerns and could not simply rest upon Romantic,
preservationist arguments.
The defense of Dinosaur National Monument marked a
success for the preservationist position.

However, it

marked as well the continuing tension between the dominant
social paradigm and its counterreaction.

Because Modernism

was the dominant social paradigm, preservationists could not
successfully argue for or defend their position without
ultimately addressing conservationists' commercial (and
scientific) concerns.

The Romantic spiritual and aesthetic

arguments of the preservationists had to be tempered with
the economic reasoning of the conservationists to make their
arguments justifiable.

EPILOGUE

According to Sheldon Wolin, the idea of paradigms is
challenging in that it no longer allows for an "overly
simplified view" of science, philosophy, worldviews, and the
societal values they come to influence (Wolin, 131).

A

society's worldview can be seen as being conditioned by its
dominant social paradigm, which provides it with a core
cluster of beliefs, values, and ideals that influence their
views regarding society itself, its government, and an
individual's responsibility within society.

However, these

paradigms often fail to resolve adequately crises and
anomalies within their interpretive framework and give rise
to new, competing paradigms.
The importance of paradigms as an interpretive device,
as this paper demonstrates, can be seen in the discussion of
the history of American wilderness preservation and the
development of the conservation movement.

As previously

indicated, there were two competing strains of thought
articulated in the preservation and conservation movements,
each representing a competing paradigm.

The

preservationists represented the literary and philosophical
counterreactions to the dominant social paradigm of
113
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Modernism, while the conservationist represented the
commercial and economic forces sanctioned by Modernism.
The politics of wilderness preservation can therefore
be understood in light of the tension experienced between
Modernism and its counterreaction, as seen in the history of
American attitudes towards wilderness beginning in the late
nineteenth century.

While preservationists brought their

"romantic" arguments to bear upon social issues affecting
wilderness, it became clear that their position was
untenable without employing commercial arguments as defined
by Modernism as well.

Although the preservationist

arguments have gained some strength in the years since the
late nineteenth century, the tension between conservationist
and preservationist traditions continues to exist.
In paradigmatic terms, the failure of preservationists
to successfully argue for wilderness preservation without
addressing commercial interests reiterates the point that
Modernism remains the dominant paradigm.

Its theoretical

and practical framework, at least in the area of wilderness
preservation, remains viable and must therefore be
interpreted as successfully meeting the challenges presented
to it by its anomalies and crises.

This paper, however,

does not assume that Modernism is without critics and
competition from other paradigms.
question:

This in turn warrants the

Must there be a paradigmatic shift in order to

preserve wilderness for preservationist (spiritual) ends?
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The counterreactions to Modernism and its views on
nature treated in this paper represent just one of many
paradigmatic alternatives to Modernism.

However, the

alternative explored here keeps humankind as its focal
element, as does Modernism.
anthropocentric.

Both paradigms are

The paradigmatic shift then to preserve

wilderness for preservationist ends need not be that
drastic.

One possible approach, then, to this question may

be found in Albert Borgmann's work Technology and the
Character of Contemporary Life.
According to Borgmann, Modernism's science and
technology have failed to live up to the promise of liberty,
prosperity, and individual development:
Technology is geared to meet challenges, to dam
rivers, drain swamps, log forests, and mine
coal. Wilderness areas within this framework,
appear as the last bastions yet to be taken by
technology, the last areas where we would be
able to cut, drill, and extract.
At the very
least these areas should be made available as
recreational resources.
But wilderness is a
challenge to this entire way of dealing with
nature, i.e., to technology itself.
In the
controversies
about
the
establishment
of
wilderness areas, the unspoken disagreement is
always
on
how
we
should
understand
the
challenge of nature, whether we should meet the
challenge with domination or with respect
(Borgmann 1984, 185).
While it is clear that Modernism's science and technology
has sought for the past three centuries to dominate nature,
Borgmann suggests that Romantic claims need not abandon its
homocentrism nor its science and technology in their
attempts at preservation.
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Humankind is indeed guilty of a violent past towards
nature through its use of science and technology in attempts
to secure the promise of Modernism.

Nature was brought

under the domination of civilization in an effort to
liberate and enhance the human spirit.

However,

" [ojnce the

heedlessness of the exploitation of the natural resources
came to be recognized as a danger to the welfare of
technology," according to Borgmann:
the latter's conceptual resources...could be
drawn upon to bring technology in balance with
its
physical
setting.
To
act
in
the
technological spirit of scientifically grounded
security and stability is to have proper
respect for the limits and fragility of the
natural environment.
It is consistent with
that sort of respect to urge the protection and
preservation of those parts of nature that are
not known to be useful but may turn out to be
so in the future (Borgmann, 185).
This of course is exactly the vein in which preservationists
have had to dress their arguments from the very beginning, a
tactic that is now failing them.

Moreover, as Christopher

Stone notes:
When [preservationists] argue this way, to the
exclusion of other arguments or find themselves
speaking
of
"recreational
interests"
so
continuously as to play up to and reinforce,
homocentric perspectives, there is something
sad about the spectacle.
One feels that the
arguments
lack
even
their
proponent's
convictions.
I expect that they want to say
something less egoistic and more emphatic but
the
prevailing
and
sanctioned
modes
of
explanation in our society are not quite ready
for it (Stone 1974, 43).
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How then can technology come to be used to argue for
wilderness without surrendering completely to the Modernist
forces technology has come to represent?
Technology may be utilized to support more spiritual
claims upon wilderness if technology can be reformed.

The

first step in this process is the acceptance of the idea
that humankind's significance is best understood through its
engagement with things that are recognized and respected in
their own right.

As Borgmann states:

we must distinguish, then, between the base
anthropocentrism of mature technology and the
higher anthropocentrism of the respect for
things in their own right. We can also put the
point in [an alternate manner] and say that the
liberation of nature is inseparable from human
liberation (Borgmann, 193).
Borgmann is not endorsing the impossible task of abandoning
technology.

He is, rather, calling for a move away from the

base technology used in Modernism to a higher technology —
a technology that would take into account the fact that
humankind is best served by respecting the natural world in
its own right.
An element of this new maturity is simply the
acceptance of technology with all of its possible disruptive
forces.

These forces do exist and, of course, cannot simply

be ignored.

As Borgmann indicates, respect for wilderness

will never again be nourished by its formerly indomitable
wildness (Borgmann, 194).

Rather, respect for wilderness

emanates from its fragility and vulnerability, especially in
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the face of technology.

Where subduing wilderness teaches

the acceptance of technology, humans also learn to respect
the wilderness through technology's destructiveness
(Borgmann, 194).

This acceptance comes not from the

resources or power that nature might provide but rather its
beauty or spiritual qualities.
Science and technology, according to Modernism, is
infinite in its resourcefulness.

However, in the

procurement of spiritual qualities, technology is indeed
limited.

Technology,

in fact, cannot overcome or secure it.

According to Borgmann:
[Technology] can procure something that engages
us fully and in its own right only at the price
of gutting or removing it.
Thus wilderness
teaches us not only to accept technology, but
to limit it.
The limitation of technology is
an impossible task when it is undertaken with a
view to technology only (Borgmann, 195).
However, when technology is understood in terms of
humankind's need for respectful engagement with the nature
that surrounds him, principled and sensible steps to
wilderness preservation are possible.

In essence, humankind

can learn from wilderness that pretechnological experiences
and values are not lost in Modernism, merely blunted or
hidden and that a new, mature, technology that weds human
liberation with that of nature, might help humankind to
achieve them.
As history shows, preservationists need not
necessarily witness a radical paradigm shift in order to

preserve wilderness for spiritual ends.

However, while

Modernism still dominates, preservationists will need to
address its concerns to advance their ends.
technology may represent the key.

As suggested,

A new, more mature view

of technology, with its initial promise of enhancing and
liberating mankind, could lead to the view of mankind’s
liberation as inseparable from the liberation of nature.
Although this view in itself represents a shift in
technology's emphasis, an attempt at a new technology need
not require a radical paradigmatic shift away from
Modernism, merely a refocusing of technology's goals.

In

this scheme, technology and wilderness would no longer be at
odds, allowing preservationists to employ technological,
rather than commercial and economic, valuation in order to
secure wilderness preservation for its spiritual ends.
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